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In this dissertation, I ask: Which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are 
conducive to member state interest convergence?  Scholars testing the effects of IGOs on state 
behavior usually control for state interests in order to counter realist arguments.  However, by 
doing so, they may be missing one channel through which IGOs ultimately affect state behavior 
– through changes in state interests.  While research on socialization informs the study of interest 
convergence, it is insufficient to answer the question of which attributes of IGOs make them 
conducive to state interest convergence.  These studies consist largely of case studies with which 
one cannot easily control for material factors that affect member state interests and they focus on 
the induction of new member states into an existing community.  I argue instead that all states 
are subject to the acceptance of ideas (both normative and cognitive) that can affect how they 
define their interests and that it is more appropriate to look at pairs of states to assess their 
interaction affects their similarity to each other. 
I argue that greater interaction between member states provides more opportunities for 
the transmission of ideas between them and therefore greater convergence in how they define 
their interests.  I therefore expect IGOs with more substructures and covering more issues to be 
more conducive to interest convergence.  I also propose that different types of similarity between 
states (regime type and cultural similarity) can make states predisposed to the acceptance of 
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ideas from one another and thus enhance the degree to which intra-IGO interaction may lead to 
interest convergence.   
The aforementioned hypotheses are tested in statistical models, using an original dataset 
of IGOs or IGO structures as the key independent variables.  The findings provide support for 
the theory that more interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence.  The findings 
with regard to dyadic attributes are mixed, providing support for the idea that dyads with 
common cultural attributes experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction 
within IGOs than other dyads, while domestic regime type similarity has the opposite effect to 
that expected. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation I ask: Which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are 
conducive to a convergence in their member states’ interests over time?  Answering this question 
also means responding to the more general question of whether member states’ interests 
converge over time as a result of joint IGO membership and, if so, how.  While much research 
has been done on the question of whether and how membership in IGOs affects state behavior, 
the idea that they may do so by first leading to changes in state interests has largely been 
ignored.   However, the question of whether interests are endogenous to interaction within IGOs 
is not new.  In fact, more than two decades ago, Stephen Krasner broached the issue of whether 
international regimes have feedback effects on the basic causal variables that have led to their 
creation, which include not only the distribution of power but also state interests (Krasner 1982: 
500).  Constructivist scholars have also argued for treating interests as endogenous to interaction, 
especially through work on socialization within IGOs.  Yet neoliberal institutionalist scholars 
continue to control for interests when examining the effects of IGOs on state behavior.  By doing 
so, they may be missing part of the effect of IGOs on behavior.   
The work of scholars studying socialization within IGOs goes some way toward 
explaining how state interests may become more similar over time, but is insufficient to answer 
the question of which attributes of IGOs lead to a convergence of interests at the state level.  
First, most studies of socialization either provide evidence of the socialization of individuals 
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within one IGO or focus on a few cases of normative change within one or a few IGOs.  The 
former does not necessarily lead to changes in how interests are defined at the state level.  The 
latter does not allow for a robust assessment of which attributes of IGOs are conducive to interest 
convergence between member states, since there is not sufficient variation across IGOs.  Case 
studies also limit one’s ability to find evidence for the causal role of ideas while controlling for 
the various material factors that affect state interests.  Second, the majority of work on 
socialization focuses on IGOs in Europe and therefore does not explore how intra-IGO 
interaction can affect state interests in other regions or within global IGOs.   
Finally, I argue that answering the question of how IGOs lead to a convergence in 
member states’ interests requires a shift away from the focus on socialization, which has been 
defined as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” 
(Checkel 2005: 804).  This focus on socialization limits one’s analysis to changes in how new 
members of IGOs converge toward the norms of the existing community.  I argue for a focus on 
IGOs as structures within which all member states interact with each other and have the 
opportunity to both persuade other actors and take on new ideas themselves.  In addition, both 
normative ideas and cognitive ideas about cause-and-effect relationships can lead to changes in 
how states’ define their interests and ultimately the policies that they pursue.   
The literature on policy diffusion and learning can also be informative regarding how 
ideas spread between actors.  However, explaining diffusion requires both that one specify the 
logic by which actors take on new ideas or policies and the channels through which they get this 
information.  While some work on policy diffusion argues that actors simply use information to 
mimick successful policies, other work does argue for a prior diffusion of ideas that make certain 
policies legitimate.  However, there is very little discussion of where this information comes 
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from in the international system.  I argue that much diffusion occurs within IGOs and therefore, 
in this dissertation, I attempt to answer the question of how interacting within IGOs can lead 
state agents to take on new ideas, transmit them to the domestic context, and thus redefine state 
interests.  This ultimately results in changes in state policy, although this process takes time. 
1.1 THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
In order to explain how interaction within IGOs is conducive to interest convergence between 
member states, I set forth a theory in this dissertation which focuses on IGOs as structures within 
which individuals in different states interact.  My theory is based on the simple proposition that 
more interaction provides greater opportunities for actors to exchange ideas.  While I have 
offered the process of persuasion as one causal mechanism through which ideas are transmitted 
from one actor to another, it is certainly viable that actors take on new ideas as a result of their 
interaction within IGOs even when there is no purposive attempt to persuade them by other 
actors. 
This is not a dissertation about socialization.  First, not all socialization at the individual 
level should lead to interest convergence at the state level.  An individual may be socialized into 
certain norms of behavior within an IGO, but this has little to do ultimately with how states 
define their interests outside of the context of that particular IGO.  Second, I argue in subsequent 
chapters that new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as well as norms can be accepted by 
state actors and lead to a change in how state interests are defined.   
Consequently, I argue that changes in identity are not required for changes in how states 
define their interests to occur.  However, I do argue that common characteristics of states that 
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lead actors to have a common identity may heighten the degree to which persuasion occurs.  This 
is based on the idea from reference group theory that actors who will be more likely to consider 
the merits of information provided by other actors that they deem to be in their peer group. 
In this dissertation, I not only seek to explain how membership in IGOs may lead to 
interest convergence, but also which attributes of IGOs make this process more likely.  
Beginning with the proposition that more interaction leads to more opportunities for actors to 
take on similar ideas about what they want, how best to achieve what they want, and which 
options are legitimate for achieving those goals, I propose that IGOs that foster greater 
interaction between member states should be the most conducive to interest convergence.  I 
hypothesize that pairs of states will experience a greater convergence in their interests the more 
they interact within IGOs with a high number of substructures and the more they interact within 
IGOs covering more than two main issue areas as these two dimensions are proxies of the 
amount of interaction that goes on within IGOs.  A change in states’ interests requires that the 
ideas taken on at the IGO level be transmitted to the domestic context and become 
institutionalized in the domestic setting.  Therefore, I also hypothesize that IGO structures 
involving high-level leaders should be more conducive to interest convergence since the actors 
involved in this interaction have more power to change how the states’ interests are defined. 
Finally, I do not expect all pairs of states to experience interest convergence to the same 
degree as a result of interaction within IGOs.  Based on the proposition discussed above stating 
that more similar actors should be more susceptible to persuasion by one another, I hypothesize 
that states that are both liberal democracies, that have a similar score on the 
democracy/autocracy scale, and that have common cultural attributes should experience greater 
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interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs and IGO substructures found to be 
conducive to interest convergence. 
1.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
There are a number of ways in which this dissertation contributes both to the literature on 
international relations and to our understanding of how intergovernmental organizations can 
enhance the prospects for cooperation and peace between states.  The key contribution of this 
dissertation is to demonstrate, using rigorous research methods, that state interests are 
endogenous to interaction and to examine how the interests of different states become more 
similar as a result of their interaction within IGOs.  While the theory presented here builds on 
existing theory on socialization, learning, and the diffusion of innovations, it represents a 
deductive and generalizable theory of interest convergence focused, not on individuals, but on 
the process through which ideas exchanged at the international level affect interests at the state 
level. 
From an empirical perspective, the dissertation is innovative in that it provides one of the 
first tests (and surely the most comprehensive test) of the endogeneity of interests resulting from 
IGO membership using statistical methods and a global sample of IGOs.  This is an important 
step, which I hope will advance the dialogue between international relations scholars on both 
sides of the issue.  The choice to use a large-N study allows for an assessment of IGO effects net 
of changes in material factors and for a rigorous test of the theory across IGOs and across 
regions of the world.  What one loses with this method is the ability to trace the process through 
which interest convergence occurs.  It is my hope that the findings provided herein will be the 
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starting point for deeper analysis, helping to guide future research.  The findings generally 
provide support for my theory, but also raise new questions, which I will discuss in the 
concluding chapter.   
In addition, I have created an original dataset of IGOs, which can be used for future 
research on this and other questions.  By coding IGOs based on attributes related to the amount 
of interaction that they foster between member states, I open up the black box of the IGO and 
allow for more detailed analyses of IGO effects within the realm of large-N research as well.  In 
this way, one can avoid using a simple count of IGOs, the use of which assumes that the impact 
of all IGOs “accumulates in a quasi-linear fashion” (Gartzke et al. 2006: 8).  While I offer count 
variables, these are based on IGOs that meet certain thresholds for fostering a high amount of 
interaction, which allows one to capture a dimension on which IGO effects should accumulate.  
In addition, I provide measures of total IGO substructures which allows for a more direct 
measure of the amount of fora within which individuals from two member states interact. 
1.3 LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation proceeds with five additional chapters.  In this chapter, I have presented the 
research question and briefly outlined my theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a 
convergence of member state interests over time.  In Chapter 2, I discuss the existing literature 
on socialization, learning, and policy diffusion in more detail and explain how each is 
insufficient to answer the question at hand.   
In Chapter 3, I lay out my theory of interest convergence resulting from intra-IGO 
interaction.  I begin with a discussion of what interests are and briefly describe which 
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organizations meet the criteria for being considered IGOs.  I then present a more detailed version 
of the theory outlined above.  I present both hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs that should 
be conducive to interest convergence and hypotheses about similarity in dyadic attributes that 
should condition the degree to which two states experience interest convergence as a result of 
their interaction within IGOs. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of a series of statistical tests of the hypotheses regarding 
IGO attributes presented in Chapter 3.  I begin with a more in-depth discussion of the appropriate 
level of analysis when looking for the effects of IGO interaction on member state interest 
similarity.  I then describe the use of Gartzke’s Affinity data (Gartzke 1998; Gartzke and Jo 
2002) as a measure of interests for the dependent variable.  Next, I describe the other variables 
and specification of the models.  Finally, I present the results of these tests and discuss the 
implications of these findings.  The findings are supportive of my theory regarding attributes of 
IGOs that are conducive to interest convergence. 
In Chapter 5, I present the results of a series of tests of the remaining hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3 regarding the conditioning effects of dyadic attributes on the degree to 
which interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence.  I first describe the 
additional variables added in this chapter and the specification of these models, which employ 
interaction terms between the conditioning variables and two of the key IGO variables from 
Chapter 4.  The results of these tests are mixed.  However, they provide some support for the 
proposition that existing similarities between states cause actors to see each other as peers and 
therefore to be more susceptible to persuasion, resulting in an increase in their interest similarity 
to a greater degree than for dyads without existing similarities.  The findings also raise new 
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questions regarding whether joint democracy and certain cultural similarities are dimensions on 
which individual actors from different member states mutually identify. 
I conclude the dissertation with a summary of the theory and findings and a discussion of 
their implications for both academic researchers in the field of international relations and policy-
makers interested in the design and functioning of international institutions.  Finally, I discuss a 
series of extensions to this project as well as new projects that can enhance the findings 
presented here and can further explore this research agenda. 
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2.0  TREATING INTERESTS AS ENDOGENOUS 
This project asks the question: Which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are 
conducive to member state interest convergence as a result of their interaction within these 
institutions?  The idea that interests are endogenous to interaction is not novel.  In fact, more 
than two decades ago, Stephen Krasner broached the issue of whether international regimes have 
feedback effects on the basic causal variables that have led to their creation, which include not 
only the distribution of power but also state interests (Krasner 1982: 500).  Yet Institutionalist 
scholars continue to control for interests when examining the effects of IGOs on state behavior.  
By doing so, they may be missing part of the effect of IGOs on behavior.  While the main 
proponents of treating interests as endogenous to interaction within international institutions 
have been constructivist scholars, there are other bodies of literature that relate to the question of 
how actor interests converge.  This literature informs the theory that will be presented in Chapter 
3, but is insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to a convergence in member state 
interests and which attributes of IGOs are most conducive to this process.  In this chapter, I will 
discuss each of these bodies of literature, how they relate to the question at hand, and in what 
ways they are insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to interest convergence over 
time. 
I begin with a discussion of the literature on socialization, a process through which states 
come to accept new norms, thus leading to a change in how they define their interests.  The 
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literature on socialization is insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to member 
state interest convergence for several reasons.  First, much literature on socialization focuses on 
the conditions under which the socialization of individuals is likely to occur within IGOs, 
without considering how the new norms internalized by these actors will affect how states’ 
interests are defined.  Second, there a number of empirical limitations, including a focus on case 
studies within one IGO or a handful of IGOs that do not allow one to determine which attributes 
of IGOs are most conducive to interest change.  Large-N studies that attempt to test the 
socialization hypothesis are inadequate to answer the question of this project because they either 
do not focus on interest convergence as the dependent variable or do not delve into the question 
of what it is about IGOs that makes them conducive to socialization.  Finally, in explaining state 
interest convergence I argue for a shift in focus from that provided by the concept of 
socialization as it has traditionally been defined.   Most importantly, I argue, interaction between 
state agents within IGOs might cause actors to take on new ideas about cause-and-effect 
relationships as well as normative ideas. 
With this broader focus in mind, I then discuss how literature on the diffusion of 
innovations can usefully inform the study of interest convergence resulting from intra-IGO 
interaction.  However, this literature includes a variety of theories for how policy practices are 
spread to different states.  Some of this work does not focus on the spread of cognitive and 
normative ideas as a key factor underlying the process of policy diffusion.  Others do so, but fail 
to sufficiently test diffusion through networks of communication, especially through IGOs.  
Finally, this literature does not aim to explain interest convergence, but rather the 
implementation of similar policy preferences. 
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In Chapter 3, I will put forth a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a 
convergence of interests between member states, attempting to rectify the shortcomings of the 
existing literature.  First, I will address each of the aforementioned sets of literature and how they 
are insufficient to answer the question at hand. 
2.1 SOCIALIZATION 
As noted in the previous chapter, constructivist scholars’ main critique of realist and 
institutionalist studies of IGO effects is that they treat interests as exogenous to the interaction of 
states within IGOs, with interests defined primarily in terms of material factors.  One research 
agenda emanating from the constructivist approach focuses on socialization, a macro-process 
through which states come to accept new norms, which ultimately changes how they define their 
interests (e.g. Finnemore 1996; Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Checkel 1999; Johnston 2001; Kelley 
2004; Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005).  Socialization has been defined 
as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005: 
804). 
Socialization scholars have set forth several causal mechanisms under various names, 
which Checkel (2005) and his co-contributors to a special issue of International Organization 
(IO) have boiled down to three main causal mechanisms through which actors can come to 
internalize the same norms: strategic calculation, role playing, and persuasion/normative suasion 
(Johnston 2001; Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005; Johnston 2005).  Essential to socialization theory is 
the notion that actors sometimes follow not a “logic of consequences,” but a “logic of 
appropriateness,” meaning that an actor behaves in a certain way because they believe that is the 
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right thing to do, rather than simply because there is some material reward/punishment for doing 
so/failing to do so.  “Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for 
themselves in a specific type of situation” (March and Olsen 2006: 804).  However, actors may 
at first follow the norms of an IGO for strategic reasons, whether involving social or material 
rewards, and then come to internalize those norms, continuing to follow them when material 
incentives to do so no longer exist (Checkel 2005: 804).   
Drawn from the organizational and social psychology literature, another path to 
socialization is referred to as role playing.  Role playing is thought to occur when an actor, being 
unable to calculate the costs and benefits of all possible actions, takes a shortcut from the cues of 
the organization or group.  In other words, actors are “boundedly rational” (March and Simon 
1981).  As Checkel (2005: 810) acknowledges, this does not involve a “process of reflective 
internalization driven by communicative processes,” but it does involve “noncalculative 
behavioral adaptation”.  Such role playing can eventually lead to the acceptance of a certain role 
and certain behaviors as appropriate.  Finally, these scholars lay out a third path to the 
internalization of norms through persuasion, in which actors actively put forth arguments and 
attempt to persuade each other to accept something as “the right thing to do” (Checkel 2005: 
812). 
Despite the usefulness of the aforementioned theoretical developments, these causal 
pathways to socialization do not necessarily lead to a convergence of interests at the state level.  
These processes cannot have fundamental effects on state-level interests unless state agents 
and/or IGO bureaucrats come to see a certain issue (and therefore their state’s interests) 
differently, leading to a change in how they define their state’s interests and those individuals 
bring their new perspectives back to the state.  If these conditions are not met, then we can only 
 12 
say that this socialization of state agents affected particular bargaining outcomes within a 
particular IGO, an important finding nonetheless, but one that does not explain the subject of the 
present study: state interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs.  Keeping these 
conditions in mind, I present a theory in the following chapter aimed at explaining state interest 
convergence rather than simply individual-level socialization. 
2.1.1 Limitations of Empirical Tests of Socialization 
The socialization literature is also insufficient to answer the question of which IGO attributes are 
conducive to member state interest convergence due to a number of empirical limitations.  One 
limitation of the socialization literature derives from the fact that most empirical studies of 
socialization use the small-N approach, looking at only a few specific cases of IGO-induced 
socialization.  Although these are valuable studies, one cannot sufficiently control for the various 
factors that affect changes in state interests when analyzing a small number of cases and without 
looking at IGOs with varying attributes.  There have been some large-N studies of socialization, 
but they have focused on the socialization of individuals within a particular IGO (Beyers and 
Dierickx 1998; Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005).  Because of the level of analysis of 
such studies, they fail to explain and test for a long-term convergence of state interests as a result 
of intra-IGO interaction, but rather explain only the socialization of individual state agents and/or 
the effect this has on particular bargaining outcomes. 
In addition to limitations due to sample size, most studies of socialization have restricted 
their analyses to the effects of European institutions, which some argue to be a “relatively easy 
case,” (Johnston 2005) for testing socialization theory (e.g. Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Kelley 
2004; Beyers 2005; Gheciu 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005).  These 
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studies have contributed in important ways to theorizing about socialization, but there is an open 
question as to whether the attributes of these European IGOs that they propose to be conducive 
to socialization can be found to have the same effects when present in IGOs across various 
regions. 
Bearce and Bondanella (2007) attempt to rectify these shortcomings by testing the 
socialization hypothesis in a global sample, using a statistical model.  They provide evidence that 
joint IGO membership leads states’ interests to converge over time.  In this project, I go beyond 
simply looking for evidence that IGOs lead to interest convergence and ask which institutional 
attributes of IGOs are most conducive to state interest convergence.   
Some rationalist scholars have begun to take more seriously the notion that interests may 
be endogenous to interaction by testing implications of constructivist theory alongside their 
hypotheses about the effects of international institutions on state behavior (e.g. Gartzke et al. 
2006; Mitchell 2006).  However, while they allow for the possibility that interests are 
endogenous to interaction within IGOs, these studies are not aimed at explaining interest 
convergence and they do not delve into the question of how overlapping IGO membership might 
lead to interest convergence.  Therefore, this project is meant to fill a gap in the literature not 
only by presenting a generalizeable theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to interest 
convergence, but also by providing a test of this theory across IGOs and across regions. 
2.1.2 Beyond Socialization into Community Norms 
In addition to proposing a more generalizable theory and tests of state interest convergence, I 
argue that explaining state interest convergence requires more than a focus on socialization as it 
is traditionally defined.  Socialization has been defined as “a process of inducting actors into the 
 14 
norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005: 804) and as “the internationalization of 
new group norms through persuasion and communicative action” (Johnston 2001: 1014).  The 
latter definition is less restrictive because it does not imply that socialization occurs only when 
new actors are inducted into the existing norms of a community.  Indeed, norms change over 
time within a community of states and I argue that all actors are constantly subject to persuasion, 
which may lead to new beliefs affecting how they define their interests.  However, as evidenced 
by both of these definitions, the term socialization is associated with an internalization of group 
norms.  I argue that the interaction between state agents within IGOs, leading to persuasion and 
communicative action, may not always involve community norms about appropriate behavior, 
but also the diffusion between member states of ideas regarding cause-and-effect relationships.  
As Campbell (1998: 384) points out, ideas can be either cognitive or normative: “At the 
cognitive level ideas are descriptions and theoretical analyses that specify cause-and-effect 
relationships whereas at the normative level ideas consist of values and attitudes.”  As I assert in 
the following chapter, a change in either of these types of ideas can lead to a change in interests. 
This means not only that interest convergence can result from the acceptance of new 
ideas as well as norms, but also that, in order to understand this process, one should focus on 
IGOs not only as existing communities into which new members are inducted, but also as 
structures within which individual states interact.  After all, while IGOs may sometimes be 
agents of ideational or normative diffusion, they are also structures within which state actors 
interact.  In addition, the norms held by a community of states are subject to change over time.  
Therefore, it would be a mistake to conceive of socialization as a process that occurs when a new 
member joins an IGO and then ends.   
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As Finnemore (1996) points out, certain actors create norms for consequentialist reasons, 
but then other actors are socialized to accept them and behave accordingly.  The “norm 
entrepreneurs” can be one or more states or state agents as well as actors within the IGO 
bureaucracy/secretariat.  Therefore, one member state can have an effect on how another state or 
group of states define their interests through their interaction within the IGO, without a shift in 
the ideas and norms of the IGO as a whole community.  What this implies for the study of state 
interest convergence is that the unit of analysis should be pairs of states, rather than IGOs, a 
subject to which I will return in subsequent chapters. 
2.2 DIFFUSION AND LEARNING 
In addition to the socialization literature, scholarly work on diffusion and learning deals with 
convergence in the ideas held by state policy-makers and a resulting convergence of their policy 
practices.  As noted above, the adoption of new beliefs does not necessarily involve the 
acceptance of community norms leading to a new “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 
2006), but may simply involve the diffusion between member states of ideas regarding cause-
and-effect relationships (Campbell 1998).  Theories about the diffusion of innovation originating 
in the American and comparative politics literatures (e.g. Gray 1973; Collier and Messick 1975; 
Berry and Berry 1990; Rogers 1995) can be quite usefully applied to international relations.  In 
fact, there is much work in international relations examining diffusion (e.g. Starr 1991; True and 
Mintrom 2001; Jörgens 2003; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Weyland 2005; Lee and Strang 2006; 
Simmons et al. 2006).  Diffusion can be defined as “the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” 
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(Rogers 1995: 5).  An innovation can be thought of as an idea that is new to an actor (Gray 1973: 
1174). 
While work on socialization sometimes discusses socialization as involving a diffusion of 
norms (e.g. Johnston 2001), the extensive work on diffusion has not been called upon to address 
the question of whether and how interests may be endogenous to interaction.  This is probably 
because the diffusion literature focuses on the diffusion of policy practices.  However, some 
scholars argue that the diffusion of policy practices occurs through a diffusion of norms and 
ideas.  To the extent that this is the case, then the diffusion of policy practices is really a 
diffusion of ideas leading to interest redefinition reflected by the implementation of new 
policies.1   
Despite its relevance to the present study, the existing scholarly work on diffusion is not 
sufficient to answer the question of how interaction within IGOs leads to interest convergence.  
First, much of this research proposes that diffusion occurs through causal pathways that do not 
involve the spread of ideas through communication networks, but rather simple learning from 
newly available information.  Second, to the extent that diffusion is theorized to occur through 
communication networks, this causal pathway has not been sufficiently tested empirically.  
Finally, while some of the theoretical developments from the diffusion literature can be usefully 
applied to the study of interest convergence between IGO member states, these studies neither 
focus on interaction within IGOs as a key explanandum nor aim to explain interest convergence 
as the outcome of such interaction. 
Explaining the spread of similar policies requires that one specify the logic by which 
states come to adopt innovative policies of other states, but also the channels through which 
                                                 
1 The definition of interests and its relationship with policy preferences will be further discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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those innovations spread.  Some work focuses on diffusion that involves emulating the policies 
of other states, without necessarily affecting ideas.  For example, Simmons and Elkins (2004) 
argue that states adopt the same liberal economic policies as other states because the other state’s 
policy alter their payoff to adopting the policy themselves and/or because they gain information 
from the success or failures of other states’ policies and therefore mimick the successful cases.  
This “vicarious learning” (Simmons et al. 2006) is similar to mimetic isomorphism, in which 
states, being uncertain about the likelihood that certain policies will have their preferred 
outcomes model their policies on those of successful states (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).   
Borrowing from cognitive psychology, the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1985) 
has been applied in political science to describe the process through which actors, unable to 
calculate the costs and benefits of every possible policy option, seek cues from other actors as to 
which policies to enact.  For example, Weyland (2005: 282) explains the spread of pension 
reform in Latin America as the result of cognitive heuristics:  
Since attention is finite and scanning the environment for relevant information is costly, 
people simply cannot meet the ideal-typical standards of rational choice.  To proceed 
efficiently despite the inherent limits on information processing, they commonly resort to 
inferential shortcuts. 
 
Citing the shortcuts known as availability, representativeness, and anchoring (Kahneman 
et al. 1982), he argues that states use these shortcuts to copy the policies of other states that are 
readily available to them, often mistakenly take the cases on which they model their policies as 
more representative than they are, and therefore do not sufficiently adapt the model to their 
specific needs (Weyland 2005).  This is meant to explain why we see a diffusion of similar 
policies to states with very different levels of economic, social, and political development.   
Similarly to the process that leads states to use the availability and representativeness 
shortcuts, some scholars, drawing on reference group theory from social psychology, argue that 
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policy emulation is the result of actors modeling their behavior on that of others that they deem 
to be in their peer group (Strang and Meyer 1993; Rogers 1995; Axelrod 1997; Lee and Strang 
2006; Simmons and Elkins 2004).   
All of the aforementioned theories offer an explanation of diffusion involving simple 
learning and the updating of an actor’s information, but they do not tell us much about where the 
information comes from.  I will argue not only that some sort of interaction within the 
international system is required for actors to gain this information, but also that a process of 
persuasion rather than simple information gathering is involved. 
Some diffusion scholars do argue that the diffusion of policy practices involves the 
diffusion of norms and ideas that make the adoption of policy practices more likely.  For 
example, in examining changes in the size of the public sector, Lee and Strang (2006) find that 
only successful cases of downsizing were mimicked, whereas neither failed cases of downsizing 
nor successful cases of upsizing were influential.  As they infer from this finding, emulating only 
cases that confirm existing beliefs is not evidence of simply gathering new information to update 
beliefs.  They argue instead that neoliberal discourses made upsizing a legitimate practice while 
downsizing was believed to be illegitimate during the period under study.  Indeed, work 
emanating from organizational sociology indicates that practices spread more rapidly when they 
are “theorized” which means that there exists a “self-conscious development and specification of 
abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and 
effect” (Strang and Meyer 1993: 492).   
Related to the socialization literature, it may then be the diffusion of norms and ideas that 
engenders the spread of similar policy practices (see Johnston 2001).  For example, acceptance 
of a norm that liberal economic policies are good can facilitate the diffusion of specific liberal 
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practices.  Although such work does treat the diffusion of norms as prior to the diffusion of 
specific policy practice, this literature also fails to tell us much about the channels through which 
the ideas diffuse. 
So far I have discussed theories regarding the logic by which actors come to adopt new 
policy practices, but some diffusion literature focuses on the channels through which innovations 
diffuse.  Collier and Messick (1975: 1306) discuss two types of diffusion: hierarchical and 
spatial.  Hierarchical diffusion takes place as the most advanced countries adopt an innovation 
and it is then adopted by successively less advanced states, whereas spatial diffusion occurs 
along lines of geographical proximity or along major lines of communication.  Collier and 
Messick find evidence of spatial proximity in state adoptions of social security, but they do not 
specifically test for the effects of major line of communication between states.  As Soule and 
Strang (1998: 275) point out, geographic proximity facilitates all kinds of interaction and 
influence so it is difficult to discern a distinctive logic from simple spatial proximity.  In 
addition, it is often difficult to distinguish between geographic regions and “communication 
regions” (Starr 1991).  Starr cites the example of the Arab countries, which are geographically 
proximate, but are also involved in a number of common IGOs. 
Indeed, although there may be some diffusion of ideas and policies through geographic 
proximity, I argue that much diffusion occurs through IGOs.  In addition to the socialization 
literature referenced above, the literature on epistemic communities and some of the literature on 
diffusion focuses more specifically on non-geographic channels through which innovations are 
spread. 
Peter Haas (1989, 1992) argues that, because decision-makers have a desire for 
information due to their uncertainty about their interests and how best to realize them,  they are 
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therefore subject to influence by “epistemic communities” of experts that push certain ideas 
about which problems exist and how best to deal with them.  Haas and other scholars, who have 
been referred to as “weak cognitivists” (Hasenclever et al. 1996), discuss a process of “learning” 
through which actors “reevaluate cause-effect relationships and arrive at new interpretations of 
the social world” (Adler 1991).  Although epistemic communities often function through IGOs, 
this work does not test which attributes of IGOs lead to a convergence in state interests.  In 
addition, the empirical work on epistemic communities is subject to many of the same limitations 
as the socialization literature discussed above, including the restriction to small-N analysis, and 
the failure to allow for the effects of interaction between specific member states of an IGO on 
those states’ interests.  
In their study on the diffusion of liberal economic policies, Simmons and Elkins (2004) 
attempt to test learning through communication channels such as IGOs.  However, they only 
include preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties in their model.  
If it is the diffusion of ideas through interaction within multiple IGOs that makes two states’ 
interests (and therefore policies) more similar over time, then their model fails to account for a 
good deal of the communication networks through which such diffusion occurs.  Ingram, 
Robinson, and Busch (2005) demonstrate that even social and cultural IGOs can have an impact 
on trade, which they take to be evidence that IGOs foster awareness, trust, and a sense of 
common purpose between states.  Their dependent variable is trade between states, rather than 
liberal policies adopted in individual states, but the essential argument regarding the potential 
effects of IGO connectedness between two states on their relations can be extended to the spread 
of ideas between them, leading to a convergence in how they define their interests.  In the 
following chapter, I will develop such an argument.   
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While some diffusion theory should apply to the diffusion of ideas that affect states’ 
interests, the above referenced literature is focused on explaining the emergence of similar 
policies, rather than similar interests.  The purpose of this project is to explain how interaction 
within IGOs can facilitate persuasion and therefore the spread of similar ideas between states, 
leading to a convergence in how they define their interests. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
As noted above, the purpose of this project is therefore to provide a generalizable theory of how 
interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence in state interests and, based on that theory, to test 
which attributes of IGOs are most conducive to this process.  My theory goes beyond a focus on 
socialization defined as the internalization of community norms and incorporates the possibility 
that persuasion involving ideas about cause-and-effect relationships can also lead to interest 
convergence through intra-IGO interaction.  While the theories on socialization, diffusion, 
epistemic communities, and learning can be usefully applied in theorizing about the effects of 
intra-IGO interaction on states’ interests, the existing literature is insufficient to answer the 
above question.  In the following chapter, I will lay out a theory of how interaction within IGOs 
leads to a convergence of state interests over time.  In that chapter, I will also put forth a set of 
hypotheses derived from that theory to be tested in subsequent chapters. 
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3.0  EXPLAINING MEMBER STATE INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
In this chapter, I set forth a deductive theory to answer the following question: which attributes 
of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are conducive to member state interest convergence?  
In Chapter 2, I discussed the existing literature that could inform a theory of interest 
convergence, but which is insufficient to answer the question of how interaction within IGOs 
causes states to define their interests more similarly over time.  I argue for a move away from the 
concept of socialization, which implies that only new actors are subject to normative change.  
Instead, I maintain that all member state agents are subject to ideational change and that this 
could involve new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as well as normative ideas.  
Furthermore, unlike the case for much of the socialization literature, the present question 
requires a focus on state interest convergence.  Therefore, what is needed to answer the present 
question is a theory that can explain how interests converge at the state level as a result of 
interaction within IGOs.  With regard to the literature on policy diffusion, I point out that, to the 
extent that policy diffusion occurs through the spread of innovative ideas, the spread of policy 
practices is the result of interest redefinition, an idea to which I will return below.  However, the 
literature on diffusion of innovations has not sufficiently focused on the spread of ideas and 
practices through networks of communication such as IGOs, which I propose to have a large role 
to play in the process of policy diffusion. 
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As mentioned above, the process that eventually leads to a convergence in state interests 
involves the interaction of individual state agents or IGO bureaucrats from different member 
states and an internalization or acceptance of new ideas by those individuals.  A change in the 
state’s interests, however, does not occur unless these agents transmit their new beliefs to the 
domestic arena.  The question of how IGO interaction leads to state interest convergence 
therefore calls for a focus on states’ interests and factors that make the individual to state-level 
transmission of ideas more likely.  In this chapter, I will lay out a theory of how the interaction 
of individuals from different states within IGOs leads to a change in state interests and then I will 
generate hypotheses about which IGO attributes are conducive to this process.  Essentially, I 
argue that what matters most is the amount of interaction facilitated by the IGOs in which two 
states are jointly members.  I also propose that certain state attributes condition the effects of 
IGOs on interest convergence between pairs of states and I therefore put forth hypotheses 
regarding the conditioning effects of these state attributes.   
A theory of interest convergence within IGOs must necessarily begin with a discussion of 
what interests are, which is presented in the first subsection below.  After establishing what the 
term interests means for this study, I continue with a brief definition of IGOs.  In the third 
subsection, I discuss persuasion, a causal process through which intra-IGO interaction may lead 
to interest convergence.  In that section, I also lay out three useful categories of ideas that may be 
transmitted between state agents within IGOs and discuss which of them should become 
institutionalized within states thereby changing how they define their interests.   
The fourth subsection presents a general proposition regarding what it is about IGOs that 
makes them conducive to interest convergence – the amount of interaction facilitated by the 
IGOs - from which I generate three hypotheses regarding specific attributes of IGOs that should 
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facilitate greater interaction.  These attributes include the total number of substructures, the 
number of structures within which member state ministers interact, and the number of issue 
categories covered by the IGO.  
In the final subsection, I put forth a proposition regarding how state attributes may 
condition the degree to which interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence in interests 
between two states.  I propose that different types of similarity between two states can make state 
agents predisposed to the acceptance of new ideas from one another and thus enhance the degree 
to which intra-IGO interaction may lead to state interest convergence over time.  Dyadic 
attributes hypothesized to condition the effects of interaction on interest convergence include 
joint liberal democracy, regime type similarity, and common culture. 
3.1 WHAT ARE “INTERESTS”? 
Before proceeding with a theory of how member state interests converge, it is important to 
establish what is meant by interests.  When one is asked to define interests or to distinguish 
interests from preferences, one is almost unfailingly advised to see Frieden’s (1999) piece on 
preferences in search of an answer.  However, Frieden (1999: 46, fn. 4) distinguishes only 
between preferences and policy preferences, defining preferences as “preferences over 
outcomes” and policy preferences as “preferences over strategies (policies)”.  He argues that it is 
important to separate the strategic environment from an actor’s preferences.  In other words, we 
cannot deduce an actor’s preferences by looking at their indicated preference (or actions) in a 
given situation because the strategic environment may lead the actor to indicate a preference for 
some policy that will get them closer to their preferred outcome than the policy for which they 
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have the highest utility.  To deduce an actor’s preferences, Frieden (1999: 61) suggest that one 
look at a prior “box”: "If we want to know a firm's preferences over trade protection, we start one 
level up, in a bigger box, in which the firm's properties and environment are known, and which 
lead it to order its trade preferences".  He makes no distinction between interests and preferences, 
but only a difference between preferences and policy preferences. 
One is still left searching for a clear definition of what interests/preferences are.  Indeed, 
whether there is even a difference between interests and preferences depends on how one defines 
interests.  Even if we define interests as preferences over outcomes, the difference between 
interests and policy preferences is really a matter of the level of abstraction used to define 
interests.  We can think of three points on a continuous ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970).  At 
the most abstract level, interests could be defined as what an actor values in terms of ultimate 
outcomes.  For example, with regard to states’ interests, it is commonly accepted that states want 
power, security, and wealth (Finnemore 1996).  Similarly, Wendt (1994: 385) discusses an 
actor’s “corporate identity”, which “refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute 
actor individuality,” and the four interests generated by that identity: physical security; 
ontological security (predictability in relationships to the world); recognition as an actor by 
others; and development (aspiration for a better life).  These interests represent the desires of 
states at their most abstract level.  However, as Finnemore (1996: 1-2) points out, states have 
different beliefs about what constitutes power, security, and wealth and how they can best attain 
them.  States’ definitions of what constitutes and facilitates the attainment of these more 
fundamental desires would be lower on the ladder of abstraction.  At the least abstract level 
would be specific and detailed policies that state decision-makers believe to be the best strategy 
for achieving those core desires in a given situation.  All of these would be included in what I 
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refer to as interests.  However, as one moves down the ladder of abstraction, every type of 
interests becomes an expression of more fundamental (and abstractly defined) interests found 
higher on the ladder.    
The implementation of (or voting on) specific policies is essentially behavior that 
expresses interests at the least abstract level.  The difficulty, as Frieden (1999) points out, is to 
distinguish these expressions of interests from the strategic environment that may affect whether 
true interests are expressed or are rather masked by some strategy employed to obtain an 
outcome that brings one closer to achieving one’s true interests.  This does not mean that the 
interests found at this least abstract level (which could be called policy preferences) should not 
be included in the definition of interests.  The problem noted by Frieden is actually a matter of 
measurement, not of conceptual definition.  In other words, one must be careful to control for 
factors in an actor’s strategic environment, when trying to obtain a measure of true interests.   
This is especially important for the present project, which aims to explain the 
convergence in states’ interests resulting from interaction with other states and the acceptance of 
new ideas and not from changes in the strategic environment.  Some research questions may 
require an examination of interests at some specific level of abstraction, but, as will become clear 
with the elaboration of my theory below, this is not necessary here.  What is important is to show 
that changes in material factors or strategic situations are not the only path ultimately leading to 
changes in state behavior as a result of IGO membership, but that changes in the ideas held by 
state decision-makers and the definition of state interests resulting from intra-IGO interaction do 
so as well.  Furthermore, the goal of this project is to determine what attributes of IGOs facilitate 
this process.  The need to separate strategic behavior from interests, however, will be dealt with 
in the discussion of measurement in the following chapter.   
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Scholars differ in the meanings they attach to the term interests and many scholars of 
international relations (IR) would use this term to refer only to the most abstract, core values of a 
state that I discussed above, using the term preferences to refer to more concrete desires for 
specific outcomes.  To reiterate, I include both core desires and specific preferences under the 
concept of interests because, as I argue above, these are all expressions of what a state wants at 
more or less specific levels of abstraction.  Each more specific expression of what a state desires 
is based on how the states’ interests are defined at a more abstract level.  In the simplest terms, 
interests are what a state wants.  In the empirical work that tests my theory in subsequent 
chapters, I use measures that may fit under what is traditional labeled as preferences, but in the 
theory laid out below, I argue that changes in the ideas held by state agents can change what 
those preferences are because they have changed how a state defines what it wants (i.e.  the 
empirical implications of a change in a states’ interests at a more abstract level can be found in 
changes in how they express those interests at a less abstract level).  Having clarified what is 
meant by interests, I now move on to define another term that is essential to my theory: 
intergovernmental organizations. 
3.2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
IGOs are organizations that are created by three or more sovereign states to accomplish some 
common objective(s).  To be considered an IGO for the purposes of this project, such 
organizations must hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years and possess a 
permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters (Pevehouse et al. 2003).  IGOs therefore 
bring together the agents of member states within various IGO bodies and they also bring 
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together individuals from various member states to work within IGO secretariats.  Through 
interaction within these bodies, state agents can transmit new ideas to each other, thus changing 
how they define their states’ interests. 
There are a variety of IGOs that fit into the above description.  Many of the same types of 
structures come up repeatedly as one looks across IGOs, although the number or presence of 
various structures differs from one IGO to the next.  There are often, but not always, structures 
for representatives of states.   If such a structure exists, it is often accompanied by some sort of 
executive body that manages the agenda on a more regular basis.  IGOs often have a number of 
committees and working groups which work on specific issues.  In addition to secretariat 
divisions that carry out the administration of the IGO itself, some IGOs also have technical 
divisions made up of bureaucrats or experts who carry on regular IGO functions such as research 
or special programs.   
IGOs can also differ on such dimensions as membership restrictions, purpose, and 
decision-making structure.  For example, there are a series of IGOs with global membership, 
many of which were developed in the post-World War II era.  Several of these IGOs are 
specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).  There are also several IGOs designed to 
accomplish regional integration on a range of issues.  These organizations include, among others, 
the European Union (EU), Mercosur, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the 
League of Arab States (LAS), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  In 
addition to those aimed at regional integration, there are IGOs designed to deal with specific 
issues faced by states in a given region such as the International Red Locust Control 
Organization (IRLCO).  Some IGOs have restricted membership that is defined not by spatial 
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proximity, but by the common production of specific products such as cotton, coffee, or jute 
products.  While some IGOs, such as the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary 
Gold, are designed to accomplish very specific goals, most are designed to foster continuing 
cooperation in a given field or set of fields.  
Whether differences on the aforementioned dimensions matter for how the IGO affects 
state behavior is a question for another project.  As will become evident below, the theory put 
forth here is deduced from the idea that more interaction should lead to greater interest 
convergence between pairs of states.  To the extent that the various functions or purposes of an 
IGO discussed above affect the degree to which states interact within the IGO, then these 
dimensions will be accounted for in this study.  Essentially, if the proposition that more 
interaction leads to greater interest convergence is correct, then the amount of interaction that 
occurs within the IGO and who is involved in that interaction should be the only dimensions that 
matters insofar as testing the hypotheses set forth below. 
3.3 IDEATIONAL CHANGE 
I argue that interaction within IGOs facilitates a process by which individuals from different 
states exchange ideas with one another such that state agents accept new ideas that may change 
the way in which they define their states’ interests.  I identify persuasion as one causal 
mechanism through which this may occur.  There may be other causal mechanisms that lead 
from interaction to the transmission of ideas and result in interest convergence.  To the extent 
that there are others, they should push in the same direction as persuasion.  Here I focus on 
persuasion as the major mechanism through which ideational change occurs within IGOs, but 
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one can imagine, for example, that a process of ideational change can also result from learning as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
Persuasion differs from learning only insofar as the actors involved are intentionally 
trying to transfer ideas to other actors.  Following Gheciu’s (2005: 981) definition, persuasion 
can be described as follows: 
Persuasion typically occurs in social interactions between actors who have drawn 
different conclusions regarding the nature, merits, and/or implications of X action or 
policy, and in which one or more of those parties attempt, through arguments, to get their 
interlocutors to rethink their conclusions. 
 
If an actor persuades another actor that X is in their interest because it leads to Y, which is 
something they value, then this constitutes a change in their interests.  As noted above, it is 
commonly accepted that states want power, security, and wealth, but states have different beliefs 
about what constitutes power, security, and wealth and how they can best attain them (Finnemore 
1996: 1-2).  State agents can therefore be persuaded to change their beliefs about what types of 
actions or policies are in the best interest of their state.   
I maintain that persuasion does not have to involve induction into community norms in 
order to lead to interest convergence.  As I stated in the previous chapter, IGO interaction can 
also lead to the acceptance of new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships from one or a 
subset of member states as a result of their interaction within the IGO.  For the purpose of 
theorizing about state interest convergence, I categorize the new beliefs that actors can 
internalize as a result of IGO interaction into those involving: 1)  norms about behavior within 
the IGO; 2) norms about appropriate behavior that constrain policy options on a specific issue or 
set of issues; 3) and ideas about cause-and-effect relationships.  This distinction is not meant to 
imply different causal mechanisms.  Causal mechanisms are “recurrent processes linking 
specified initial conditions and a specific outcome [emphasis in original]” (Mayntz 2004: 241).  
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The causal process proposed here is persuasion, the explanandum is the structures of IGOs that 
facilitate interaction and thus allow for the process of persuasion to take place and the outcome is 
a convergence in state interests.  However, there are different types of ideas that can be 
transmitted through the persuasion process.  Only some of them, I argue, lead from the micro 
level acceptance of new ideas to the macro-level redefinition of state interests.  By specifying 
different types of ideas, I intend to demonstrate that not all changes in ideas held by individuals 
lead to changes in the definition of state interests and that a change in identities is not required 
for a change in state interests, although it does enhance the likelihood of interest convergence, as 
I will discuss below. 
As stated above, new beliefs/ideas taken on by an actor can be usefully classified into 
three categories.  First, state agents or IGO bureaucrats may be socialized to accept the norms of 
a given IGO or of a subset of member states within an IGO regarding their behavior within that 
organization.  For example, Lewis (2005) examines and provides evidence for the socialization 
of state agents within the European Union’s Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) into norms against the use of certain instrumental behavior within the negotiating 
structure of the COREPER itself.  This type of socialization is important because it can alter the 
outcomes of intergovernmental bargaining within the EU, and therefore affect the extent of 
cooperation between EU member states.  However, since these new behavioral norms are 
specific to the context of one IGO and do not pertain to some specific issue that may be 
encountered within other fora, they should not have an effect on a state’s definition of its 
interests.  
Second, individuals may be persuaded to accept norms about appropriate behavior that 
constrain the policy options available to them.  As discussed in the previous chapter, once 
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internalized, norms tell an actor which behavior is acceptable.  An actor, following a norm, 
therefore behaves in a certain way because they believe that it is the right thing to do.  In addition 
to the norms falling into the first category regarding behavior within an IGO, member states can 
come to internalize more general norms of behavior that reach beyond the context of the IGO.  If 
certain actions are no longer viewed as appropriate, then this changes the set of policy options 
that the actor will even consider and therefore changes what they believe to be in their interest.  
One example of this would be the acceptance of a norm regarding human rights practices.  
Human rights norms, once accepted/internalized, not only lead to a change in the behavior of the 
state toward its citizens, but also affect the state’s interests more profoundly.  For example, once 
a state has accepted the norm that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, 
that state may eventually come to support actions against the use of the death penalty by other 
states and come to believe that it is in their interest to keep other states from using it.  
In addition to these two types of normative ideas, individuals from various states may 
also be persuaded to accept new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships (i.e. “cognitive ideas” 
to use Campbell’s (1998) terminology) as a result of their interaction with individuals from other 
member states within IGOs.  Once persuaded, these actors thus come to change their beliefs 
about certain cause-and-effect relationships.  Unlike norms, these are not ideas about appropriate 
behavior, but rather ideas about how best to attain something they value or ideas that change 
what they believe to be of value to them.   
When actors from different states interact within IGOs, they are likely to learn and be 
persuaded by others to take on new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as well as norms 
of appropriate behavior.  For example, agents from a state whose policies widely reflect a belief 
that free trade is good for one’s economy could, over time, by interacting with agents from 
 33 
another state working on trade policy in various fora, come to persuade that state that pursuing 
freer trade policies would lead to economic prosperity for their state.2  Therefore, this process of 
persuasion is more appropriately theorized with regard to pairs of states, rather focusing only on 
IGOs as whole communities that affect all of the member states’ interests in the same way.  This 
is not to say that persuasion and the acceptance of norms by an entire IGO community does not 
occur.  However, by focusing on pairs of states belonging to a number of the same IGOs, one can 
more accurately assess their effects on each other individually and as part of larger groups within 
which they interact. 
Most theory regarding the acceptance and internalization of norms comes out of the 
constructivist literature, which proposes that identity change is an important part of this process.  
While I have not addressed identity in my discussion of persuasion, I do not reject the notion of 
identity change.  To paraphrase Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 6), the issue is not whether 
identities matter but how they matter.   
This project is about how interaction within IGOs leads to the internalization of new 
ideas and the institutionalization of those ideas in the domestic context leading to a redefinition 
of state interests.  This does not necessarily require identity change.  Identity has been invoked 
by constructivists to explain how a state defines its interests vis-à-vis other actors (Wendt 1992, 
1994).  I argue that it is not necessary for two states to develop a collective identity in order to 
transmit new norms and ideas to one another and that the development of a collective identity 
may not necessarily change how a state defines its interests outside of the context of their its 
relationship with that particular state.  As discussed above, interest convergence can result from 
                                                 
2 The idea that states should implement free trade practices could also be considered a norm, but it does not 
necessarily have to be accepted as the “appropriate” thing to do.  Rather, this could be considered the best way to 
achieve economic prosperity. 
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the transmission between individuals from different states of ideas about cause-and-effect 
relationships and not only from the acceptance of normative ideas about acceptable behavior.  
Furthermore, the acceptance of new norms by individuals from different states does not always 
lead to changes in interests and behavior at the state level.  For example, norms about 
appropriate behavior vis-à-vis other actors within an IGO should not affect the states’ interests 
outside of the IGO context.  Therefore, since my theory is about the acceptance of new ideas and 
changes in the definition of interests at the state level, I do not focus on identity change, which, I 
argue, is not necessary for a change in states’ interests. 
Some sense of common identity between two states, however, should magnify the 
diffusion of ideas between agents of the two states since, as we know from social psychology 
and related research in political science, actors are more likely to be persuaded by and take on 
new ideas from actors that they identify as peers or as part of an in-group (Mackie et al. 1992; 
Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang and Soule 1998; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Lee and Strang 
2006).  In this sense, common identity has more of an interactive effect with opportunities for 
persuasion on the degree to which two states’ interests converge.  I will return to this argument 
below when I discuss state attributes and their effects on the process of interest convergence.  
However, I will first discuss which attributes of IGOs should, by providing more opportunities 
for interaction and persuasion, lead to greater interest convergence between member states. 
3.4 WHAT MAKES IGOS CONDUCIVE TO INTEREST CONVERGENCE? 
I have argued that state interest convergence occurs through a process of persuasion of individual 
state agents that ultimately leads to a change in how states define their interests.  So what is it 
 35 
about IGOs that facilitates these processes and, more specifically, which attributes of IGOs make 
state interest convergence more likely?  Drawing on the social psychology literature, 
constructivist scholars have proposed that socialization is more likely to occur under certain 
conditions.  However, the terminology varies by scholar, while some terms appear to refer to the 
same concept and some concepts overlap.  Interaction that is proposed to be conducive to 
socialization is described as necessarily intense, frequent, dense, systematic, long, sustained, 
time-demanding, and of long duration (Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005; Johnston 
2005; Lewis 2005).  Although this fine-tuning of socialization theory is useful for lower levels of 
analysis, most of these conditions essentially condense into the same concept: the amount of 
interaction between state agents.  Only if state agents are involved in frequent interactions for 
long periods of time can they be persuaded to accept new ideas, and only if this occurs can the 
new interests they develop be transmitted to the state. 
The theory proposed herein is a deductive theory of interest convergence.  I start with the 
idea that more interaction should lead to greater interest convergence by providing more 
opportunities for persuasion, through which ideas are transmitted between actors leading to 
changes in state interests.  Then I draw hypotheses from this proposition regarding which 
specific attributes of IGOs should facilitate more interaction. 
 
Proposition 1:  The two states interact within IGOs, the more the states’ interests will 
converge over time. 
 
Despite the above proposition, interaction may not always lead to interest convergence 
because interaction will not always lead to attempts at persuasion and such attempts may not 
always be successful.  However, I maintain that increased levels of interaction between states 
 36 
within dense networks of IGOs should increase the possibilities for states to take on new ideas, 
leading to an increased likelihood of interest convergence on the whole.   
What about cases of interest divergence?  New issues may arise as a result of interaction 
within IGOs and these may lead pairs of states to experience greater conflict as a result (see, for 
example, Fausett and Volgy 2009).  However, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which two 
states discussing a given issue could actually move farther apart on that same issue in the 
absence of changes in other factors that affect their strategic situation.  In other words, it is 
unlikely for two actors to convince each other or learn from each other to move even farther 
away one from the other in how they define their interests and therefore in what they prefer in a 
given situation.  Conceptually, therefore, interaction and the transmission of new ideas should 
not lead to a divergence of interests, but other factors that also result from interaction may lead to 
a divergence in states’ interests with regard to other issues.  On the whole, however, I theorize 
that more interaction should lead to greater interest convergence.  In order to test whether the 
above proposition holds, we need hypotheses regarding the effects of specific institutional 
attributes that should lead to increased interaction between individuals from different member 
states.   
First, IGOs with more sub-structures should facilitate more interaction between member 
state agents and bureaucrats from various member states.  The logic behind this expectation is 
twofold.  The more structures for interaction that exist within an IGO, the more fora there are for 
interaction of state agents and other individuals from different states.  Also, having a high 
number of sub-structures is an indication that an IGO is active, which means that IGOs with a 
high number of sub-structures are those that have sub-structures in which state agents interact 
frequently and intensely over a long period of time.  In other words, it is unlikely that states will 
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create multiple sub-structures of an IGO if they do not interact frequently under the auspices of 
that IGO.  The mere existence of a number of sub-structures requires that the member states 
interacted to create them and normally implies that state agents have already or will continue to 
meet under the auspices of each of those substructures.  Therefore, I make the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The more IGOs with a large number of sub-structures to which two states jointly 
belong, the more their interests will converge over time. 
 
It may seem obvious that interaction within IGOs with more substructures would lead to 
greater interest convergence, but this is not a foregone conclusion for many IR scholars.  It is 
important to note that the alternative hypothesis to Hypothesis 1, as for the more specific 
hypotheses that will be laid out below, is the null hypothesis, which would lead us to expect no 
relationship between the number of substructures of IGOs within which two states interact and 
changes in the similarity of their interests.   
Those who are willing to accept the possibility of interest convergence resulting from 
interaction within IGOs, would not expect convergence to be associated with the number of 
structures within which they interact, but rather with such factors as the degree of formalization 
of the institution or the depth of integration associated with the IGO, etc.  This is the reason why 
no dataset exists that counts structures for interaction within IGOs at such a detailed level.  If the 
amount of interaction within IGO structures does not lead to interest convergence, then there 
would be no relationship between the number of substructures and the degree to which two 
member states’ interests become more similar over time and the null hypothesis would be 
supported.  By contrast, evidence of a relationship between the number of substructures of IGOs 
within which two states interact and the degree to which the two states’ interests converge over 
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time would provide support for Hypothesis 1 and for the notion that more interaction leads to 
greater interest convergence. 
As noted above, in seeking to explain state interest convergence, it is not enough to focus 
only on factors that should be conducive to the acceptance of new ideas by individuals, but also 
on factors that make it more likely that those ideas will be translated into the definition of state 
interests, which will be reflected in state policies.  More specifically than the number of 
substructures that an IGO has, which could include secretariat and technical divisions and other 
bodies that involve either international bureaucrats or only a small subset of state representatives, 
I propose that interest convergence will be more likely the more an IGO has structures for 
meetings of high-level state representatives that have the power to change how the state’s 
interests are defined and therefore how it approaches different issues.   
These high-level leaders are member state ministers3 that are involved in important ways 
in determining what is in the interest of their states in their specific domains.  These ministers 
also continue to interact with other decision-makers in the domestic context.  Therefore, they 
should be more likely to transmit the new ideas that they may obtain through intra-IGO 
interaction to other important actors at the state level and they should be more influential in 
applying them to the redefinition of state interests than individuals from different member states 
interacting within IGO structures such as secretariat divisions.  Most individuals interacting 
within IGO secretariats or other permanent bodies that do not involve high-level representatives 
of all member states do not return to the domestic policy-making forum on a regular basis (some 
never) and most are not in as important a position to affect the definition of state interests when 
they do.  In order to assess the validity of this idea, I will test the independent effect of meetings 
                                                 
3 For some states these officials are not referred to as ministers, but as high-level leaders of cabinet agencies.  From 
this point forward I will refer to them simply as “ministers.” 
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of ministers of member states on the degree to which states’ interests converge over time, based 
on the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  The more structures of IGOs in which ministers of two states interact, the more their 
interests will converge over time. 
 
It is important to note that, while the substructures of IGOs within which member state 
ministers interact form part of the total structures of the IGO, Hypothesis 2 is different from 
Hypothesis 1 in that it sets the expectation that more interaction of this specific type of state 
agent should be conducive to interest convergence.  Support for H2 can provide further support 
for H1, but if it is specifically interaction between this type of state agent that is conducive to 
interest convergence then one would expect to find a stronger relationship between the number 
of bodies in which member state ministers interact and a change in interest similarity than for the 
total number of structures within which two states interact.   
That more interaction of high-level member state representatives is conducive to interest 
convergence is not an accepted fact.  In fact, socialization scholars argue that the internalization 
of new normative ideas is more likely to occur in less politicized, more insulated settings 
(Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005).  This would apply to some meetings of representatives such as 
bodies that bring together permanent representatives, but would not apply to many of the 
meetings of member state ministers.  In addition, much of the literature relating to changes in 
interests focuses on IGO bureaucracies and epistemic communities of experts, rather than high-
level leaders.  Although the acceptance of new norms and ideas by individuals may be more 
likely within such bodies of experts, I argue that this is less likely to lead to interest redefinition 
at the state level because these individuals are not as likely return to the domestic policy-making 
arena and to have the power to implement new ideas.    
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The above hypotheses relate to attributes of IGOs that facilitate greater interaction 
between member states and therefore provide more opportunities for persuasion of state agents to 
take on new ideas, but the I have also offered a more specific hypothesis with regard to the types 
of structures that should be important in making IGO interaction conducive to member state 
interest convergence.  The last two hypotheses condition which types of individuals are more 
likely to have the power to translate new ideas taken on at the IGO level into the definition of 
state interests, which are then pursued at the international level and which ultimately shape the 
formation of state policy.   
Another indicator of a high amount of interaction within IGO structures is the number of 
issue areas covered by the IGO.  It has been proposed that issue density within an IGO can 
enhance socialization because it is not only the quantity of contact that matters but also the 
quality of interaction (Lewis 2005: 946-947) and/or the type of interaction (i.e. deliberation and 
joint problem-solving rather than intense bargaining) (Checkel 2005: 807).  However, while 
Lewis (2005) refers to the density of issues dealt with by one set of state agents, I argue that this 
is simply another indicator of the amount of interaction between those individuals.  This may 
have an effect on the degree of socialization of state agents into the norms of the institution itself, 
but it may actually have a lower impact on the degree to which agents are subject to being 
persuaded on any particular issue, especially since issue density lends itself to issue linkage and 
horse-trading.  If issue linkage is at play, then this mechanism itself would actually lead to 
changes in immediate state behavior on specific issues, but would not be reflected in a long-term 
change in how the states’ interests are defined and therefore in their future expressions of their 
interests through behavior.   
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The issue coverage of an IGO, however, can also tell us something about the amount of 
interaction of state agents within the IGO.  The more issues that the IGO deals with, especially as 
issues cut across traditional issue domains, the more communication between state agents is 
required to manage them.  Therefore, I make the following hypothesis: 
 
H3:  The more IGOs with a larger issue coverage to which two states jointly belong, the 
more their interests will converge over time. 
 
Attributes of the states themselves may also affect the degree to which the diffusion of 
ideas between state agents occurs and/or the degree to which this diffusion leads to a redefinition 
of interests at the state level.  I address these attributes in the following section. 
3.5 THE CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF STATE ATTRIBUTES 
Although the aforementioned attributes of IGOs should be conducive to interest convergence 
between states that interact within IGO structures, the degree to which those member states’ 
interests converge may be conditioned by certain attributes of the states themselves.  I propose 
that interest convergence should be greater between states whose attributes make them 
predisposed to being persuaded by each other.   
Ideas are more likely to diffuse between two states that already share core values and 
perceive each other as peers, which make persuasion more likely.  In his seminal work on 
diffusion, Rogers (1995: 287) discusses this phenomenon under the concept of homophily: 
 
When two individuals share common meanings, beliefs, and mutual understandings, 
communication between them is more likely to be effective.  Individuals enjoy the 
comfort of interacting with others who are similar.  Talking with those who are markedly 
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different from ourselves requires more effort to make communication effective.  
Heterophilous communication between dissimilar individuals may cause cognitive 
dissonance because an individual is exposed to messages that are inconsistent with 
existing beliefs, an uncomfortable psychological state.  Homophily and effective 
communication breed each other.  The more communication there is between members of 
a dyad, the more likely they are to become homophilous; the more homphilous two 
individuals are, the more likely that their communication will be effective. 
 
Attributes of states that make them, and consequently their individual agents, more similar in 
their existing values and beliefs should make the process of persuasion more effective and 
therefore yield greater interest convergence between two states. 
 
Proposition 2:  Interest convergence resulting from intra-IGO interaction should be 
greater for states that are pre-disposed to being persuaded by one another. 
 
In explaining the socialization of Central and East European states into liberal-democratic 
norms, Schimmelfennig (2005) hypothesizes that persuasion requires that discussion participants 
be “liberal-minded.”  Liberal-minded actors should be more susceptible to persuasion because 
“the essence of liberalism is tolerance and reason – openness to new, but convincing evidence,” 
which fits the requirement for actors in Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Johnston 
2005: 1016).  If liberal-minded actors are required for persuasion, then individuals from liberal 
democratic states should be more susceptible to persuasion.  Therefore, I expect that pairs of 
democratic states will be more susceptible to interest convergence.  I thus make the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4:  The effect of joint membership in more IGOs with attributes that are conducive to 
interest convergence should have a greater effect on interest similarity for dyads in which 
both states are liberal democracies. 
 
 43 
It is possible, however, that it is not the liberal-mindedness of democracies that makes 
them more susceptible to interest convergence.  Rather than requiring liberal-minded 
participants, persuasion may be more effective between democracies because of their shared set 
of core values.  Several scholars call upon such an argument to explain the phenomenon referred 
to as the democratic peace, an empirical reality that democracies almost never fight one another.  
These scholars argue that the reason that democracies do not fight each other is that the shared 
norms by which they operate domestically lead them to seek non-violent means of resolving 
international conflict (Doyle 1986; Sørensen 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; 
Raymond 1994; Weart 1994).  Calling upon Immanuel Kant, whose ideas form the basis for the 
aforementioned scholars’ arguments, Sørensen (1992: 399) reminds us that the mechanisms that 
restrain democracies from going to war are only effective in relations with other democracies, 
which share their values.   
Weart (1994) notes that, historically, not only democratic republics but also oligarchic 
republics (those granting equal rights to certain groups while excluding others) have been 
peaceful toward other republics of the same type.  This, he argues, indicates that, “Leaders who 
negotiated with fellow citizens as equals invariably treated foreign leaders in the same non-
violent manner, provided that they perceived the foreigners too as political equals” (Weart 1994: 
299).  In other words, these shared values regarding the treatment of individuals only lead states 
to seek the same practices in international relations with those states they deem to be in their peer 
group.  While the aforementioned democratic peace scholars argue that the shared values and 
norms of democracies condition their action toward each other, I argue that these same norms 
make it easier for them to persuade each other. 
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One of the conditions for persuasion-induced socialization set forth by Checkel (2005: 
813) is that the “target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing 
agency’s message.”  Since democracies already share core values, this should make it less likely 
that new ideas with which they are presented will conflict with their existing norms and ideas to 
an extent that they experience cognitive dissonance.  Persuasion should be even more effective 
between democracies because the fact of sharing these values leads them to perceive each other 
as peers and therefore to more easily accept and evaluate arguments from one another.  Research 
in social psychology has shown that persuasive messages from others perceived to be in one’s 
peer group (in-group) receive content-focused processing, while messages from those in an out-
group produce very little attitude change, regardless of the strength of the argument (Mackie et 
al. 1992).  Therefore, I propose that the distance between two states in terms of their democratic 
values should affect the degree to which they are open to being persuaded by each other or are 
susceptible to acceptance of the same norms and ideas advocated within IGOs.       
 
H5:  The closer together two states are on the democracy/autocracy scale, the more their 
interests should converge over time as a result of joint membership in IGOs with attributes 
that are conducive to interest convergence. 
 
 
While Hypotheses 4 and 5 seem similar, there are two distinct logics and that underpin 
these two hypotheses and thus they produce two slightly different expectations.  Hypothesis 4 is 
based on the logic that persuasion requires liberal-minded actors.  If this is the case, then the 
expectation is that dyads involving two liberal democratic states should experience greater 
interest convergence over time than other dyads.  Hypothesis 5 is based on the notion of 
similarity more generally – states with an existing similarity in terms of their regime type (and 
therefore norms and values – including liberalism) should be more likely to persuade each other 
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and therefore should experience even greater interest convergence than other pairs of states 
because they view each other as being in their peer group.  So, if Hypothesis 5 is correct, two 
democracies that are closer together on the democracy scale should experience greater interest 
convergence than another pair of democracies that is further apart on the democracy scale.   
One could imagine that this could function even for non-democracies that are close in 
terms of their regime type.  While two non-democracies with a similar regime type may not 
necessarily have shared norms and values to the extent that two democracies do, they may view 
each other as being in the same peer group.  Therefore, to reiterate, Hypothesis 4 is about joint 
democracies while Hypothesis 5 is about the degree of similarity in regime type between pairs of 
states.   
By the same logic that underlies the argument regarding shared democratic values, 
cultural affinity between two states could make them more susceptible to persuasion by one 
another.  The diffusion of social practices (which, as I propose above, reflect the diffusion of 
ideas) is argued to be more rapid when there is a common culture between groups (Strang and 
Meyer 1993).  There is some evidence that cultural similarity affects policy diffusion in 
international relations because states with shared cultural attributes serve as peer-based reference 
groups for each other, especially when two states share a common religion (Simmons and Elkins 
2004; Lee and Strang 2006).  A common culture would also make agents from two states more 
susceptible to internalization of the same norms and beliefs developed within an IGO.  
Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of IGOs on states interest convergence will be greater for 
dyads with cultural similarities such as a common language, ethnicity, and religion. 
 
H6: The effects of being jointly members of more IGOs with attributes that are conducive 
to interest convergence should be greater for two states with a common language, ethnicity, 
and/or religion. 
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 In the following chapter, I will discuss and conduct a set of empirical analyses to test the above 
hypotheses. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have put forth a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to member state 
interest convergence over time.  First, in order to explain state interest convergence, one must 
establish what interests are.  Interests can be equated to preferences in terms of being the 
outcomes preferred by states, but they can be expressed at any level of abstraction from very 
basic desires of states for security and prosperity to preferences for very specific policies.  Policy 
implementation and voting are expressions of interests, but one must take steps empirically to 
disentangle strategic behavior from actual interests when these concrete expressions of interests 
are used to measure interests.  The measurement of interests will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Joint memberships in IGOs, I have argued, provide the opportunity for individuals from 
different states to persuade each other to accept new ideas.  Both normative and cognitive ideas 
may be diffused between state agents within IGOs, but only certain ideas are likely to affect a 
state’s definition of its interests.  While interaction within IGOs may also lead state agents to 
develop a common identity, this matters for interest convergence only insofar as it heightens the 
likelihood that persuasive attempts will be effective, since actors are more likely to be persuaded 
by messages from other actors deemed to be in their peer group.   
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One of the main goals of this dissertation is not only to explain how IGO membership 
leads to interest convergence, but also which attributes of IGOs make interest convergence more 
likely.  I have argued that IGOs with a larger number of sub-structures should be more conducive 
to interest convergence since the existence of these structures facilitates greater interaction 
between each pair of member states.  The amount of interaction between representatives of 
member states should be even more important than simply the number of substructures of the 
IGO, especially representatives at the ministerial level, who are perhaps best positioned to 
implement new ideas, thus changing how their states’ interests are defined.  I also hypothesize 
that membership in IGOs with greater issue coverage should be conducive to greater interest 
convergence between states over time, since IGOs that cover more issues involve more 
interaction between actors from different states.   
Interaction within IGOs, however, may not have the same impact on all pairs of states.  
State agents from two liberal democratic states are expected to be more open to the evaluation of 
new arguments, which should make persuasion more effective and lead to the internalization of 
new ideas.  Also, smaller differences between two states in terms of their regime type are 
expected to increase the degree to which interaction within IGOs will lead to interest 
convergence because states that hold similar values may view each other as being in the same 
peer group and their similar core values may lead them to experience less cognitive dissonance.  
By the same logic, cultural similarity is expected to facilitate persuasion and thus enhance the 
degree to which IGO interaction leads to member state interest convergence.   
In this chapter, I have attempted to generate a deductive, generalizable theory of how 
joint membership in IGOs leads to a state interest convergence, while keeping in mind how 
specific attributes of states and of dyads may affect the degree to which the theorized process 
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occurs.  In the following chapter, I will describe and conduct a set of empirical tests of the 
hypotheses relating to IGO attributes.  In Chapter 5, I will present tests of the remaining 
hypotheses regarding the conditional effects of state and dyadic attributes on the degree to which 
interaction within certain IGOs leads to interest convergence over time. 
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4.0  TESTING IGO ATTRIBUTES 
In Chapter 3, I present a theory of how interaction within intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) may lead to a convergence in member state interests over time and, more specifically, 
which attributes of IGOs are conducive to that process.  With regard to the effects of intra-IGO 
interaction on the similarity of states’ interests, I argue that IGOs that facilitate greater 
interaction are more conducive to interest convergence.  Drawing from that proposition, I 
generated three hypotheses regarding specific attributes of IGOs that foster greater interaction 
between state agents, positing that IGOs would be more conducive to interest convergence: the 
more substructures they have, the more substructures they have for meetings of member state 
ministers, and the more issue areas they cover (these hypotheses are listed in Table 4.1).  In this 
chapter, I will discuss a series of statistical models that I have conducted in order to test these 
hypotheses, present the results of these tests, and draw conclusions from these findings. 
 
Table 4.1. List of Hypotheses regarding IGO Attributes 
Label Hypothesis 
H1 The more IGOs with a large number of sub-structures to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time. 
H2 The more structures of IGOs in which ministers of two states interact, the more their interests will converge over time. 
H3 The more IGOs with a larger issue coverage to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time. 
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 4.1 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
In this section, I will discuss the statistical models that will be used to test the hypotheses put 
forth in Chapter 3.  The unit of analysis is dyad-year and the sample includes all dyad-years for 
the period 1975-1991.4  Since I am testing whether joint membership in IGOs that have certain 
attributes leads to a convergence in state interests over time, I use the similarity in two states’ 
interests as the dependent variable.  For some of the independent variables, I count the number of 
IGOs with specific attributes to which the two states are members or the total number of certain 
types of structures that exist within all IGOs to which two states are both members.  Gartzke et 
al. (2006: 8) question the use of count variables for testing IGO effects because a simple count of 
IGOs does not allow one to model the specific attributes of IGOs and instead assumes that all 
IGOs are alike and that their impact “accumulates in a quasi-linear fashion.”  The goal of this 
project is precisely to code and test the effects of specific IGO attributes on interest convergence, 
but it is necessary to do so by counting the number of IGOs with those specific attributes to 
which the two states both belong.  This does not treat the IGOs as all being alike, but rather 
counts only IGOs that meet some theoretically-determined criteria.  Despite the appropriateness 
of using a count of IGOs, I also use variables that count the total number of substructures of all 
IGOs to which the two states belong, thus better capturing the amount of interaction between the 
two states within IGOs. 
                                                 
4  Although the data covers the period 1970-1995, the tests effectively cover 1975-1991 because of the five year 
time lag on the key independent variables, as will be discussed below, and the limitation of data for important 
control variables. 
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Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) have coded IGOs into three categories 
corresponding to increasing levels of institutionalized structure.  However, because I am testing 
for IGO effects on interest convergence, it is more appropriate to distinguish IGOs by attributes 
that are expected to be conducive to interest convergence rather than simply those that may lead 
to the absence of conflict or some other type of state behavior.  I have therefore created an 
original IGO dataset from which the key independent variables are drawn, which I will discuss 
further below. 
Gartzke et al. (2006) use the IGO-state-year unit of analysis in their test of IGO effects on 
international conflict behavior, claiming that this allows them to evaluate the impact of each IGO 
on each member state.  There are two potential problems with such an approach.  First, if one 
focuses on each IGO separately for each state, how does one control for the effects of all of the 
other IGOs to which the state belongs?  Second, I assert that IGOs have an affect on state 
interests because they promote interaction.  It would not be appropriate for the present project to 
look at states by themselves because interest convergence is a relational process.  In other words, 
one would not expect a state to be more likely to converge in interests with another state as a 
result of being a member of some IGO, but rather that they are more likely to take on more 
similar interests with a particular state that also belongs to that same IGO or a network of 
common IGOs.  Because I expect that states’ interests converge as a result of their interaction 
within IGOs to which they jointly belong, it makes sense to expect a cumulative effect as a result 
of joint memberships in more of the same IGOs.  Of course, as mentioned above, not all IGOs 
are alike and one should not expect a simple count of joint IGO memberships to have a 
cumulative linear affect on state interest similarity.  However, given the theory laid out above, it 
does make sense to expect an overall cumulative effect of joint memberships in IGOs with 
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higher levels of specific institutional attributes theorized to be conducive to the process that 
leads to interest convergence. 
4.1.1 Dependent Variable 
I will now discuss the measurement of each of the variables to be included in the model.  The 
dependent variable, which is interest similarity between two states, will be measured using 
Gartzke’s AFFINITY measure.  The AFFINITY measure is an S-score calculated using roll-call votes 
within the United Nation’s General Assembly (UNGA) (Gartzke 1998; Gartzke and Jo 2002).  
The AFFINITY variable does not capture UNGA votes, but instead captures the similarity of the 
voting decisions of two states, which is calculated using an S statistic.  For each pair of states, 
the S statistic basically calculates one minus twice the distance between the policy position of the 
two states in relation to the maximum distance between positions on that issue and sums those 
measures for all issues (i.e. for all UNGA votes in that year) (Signorino and Ritter 1999).5  
Therefore the minimum possible Affinity score is -1 and the maximum possible score is 1. 
Admittedly, this is not a perfect measure of interests.  Choosing measures that match with 
the concepts involved in social science theories is very important, but social scientists are rarely 
able to find measures that perfectly match their concepts.  The key to good social scientific 
research is to find measures that are linked closely enough to the concepts they are meant to 
operationalize that they can be expected to move together so that the observable measure can tell 
us something about the relationships between the concepts in question.  The AFFINITY measure 
does this for state interest similarity better than any measure available that could be used for 
                                                 
5 A more complete explanation can be found in Signorino and Ritter (1999). 
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cross-country comparison in a large sample and I maintain that it sufficiently captures state 
interest similarity for the purposes of testing my theory.  First, states are relatively free to vote 
their interests within the General Assembly due to the explicitly non-binding character of UNGA 
resolutions.  Second, UNGA resolutions encompass a wide variety of issues and the AFFINITY 
score is calculated based upon all votes of each state across all of the issues addressed within 
each year.  Therefore, high similarity of two states’ voting portfolios should serve as a good 
indicator of similar interests of the two states.   
It is important to note that there is a difference between what the Affinity measure is and 
what it represents.  This project is not about voting in the United Nations.  Rather, states’ votes 
in the UNGA were used to compile an indicator of the similarity between states’ interests.  
Furthermore, this is the measure widely used by Institutionalist scholars to control for interests 
when looking for the effects of IGOs on state behavior.  Using the AFFINITY measure is therefore 
all the more appropriate for a dissertation that seeks to put into question the practice of 
controlling for interests while looking for the effects of cooperation within IGOs on state 
behavior. 
A simple examination of AFFINITY measures presents some face validity.  As noted 
above, this measure scores dyadic interest similarity along a -1 to 1 range with higher values 
indicating greater similarity (Gartzke and Jo 2002).  Bearce and Bondanella (2007) illustrate this 
face validity by looking at the average AFFINITY score for dyads including the United States 
(US), based on the assumption that most readers will be familiar with the foreign policy interest 
of this state.  Figure 4.1 reproduces the diagram from Bearce and Bondanella (2007) showing 
these average AFFINITY scores for 30 US dyads covering the range of AFFINITY values and 
containing states from all regions of the world.  As one would expect, the United States-United 
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Kingdom (UK) dyad scores relatively high in terms of interest similarity while US pairings with 
states like North Korea score relatively low. 
Despite the face validity of the AFFINITY measure, some may be concerned that the non-
binding character of UNGA resolutions leads states to engage in strategic and symbolic bloc 
voting.  To significantly reduce bias that may result from bloc voting, however, one can model it 
directly by using dyadic fixed effects, thus removing its effect from the coefficient on the 
primary independent variable.  In other words, if a pair of states is involved in bloc voting, this 
effect will be captured by a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the observation is for that pair of 
states.  Therefore, the effect of the IGO variables should not reflect the effects of bloc voting.  To 
be more certain that bloc voting is not an issue, one can also show that the results do not differ 
significantly when the sample is constrained to exclude those dyads scoring at the ends of the 
AFFINITY range (i.e. cases near 1 where the two states almost always voted together and cases 
near -1 where the two states almost never voted together).  For all of the above reasons, the 
Affinity variable is a good and appropriate measure of interest similarity between states and will 
serve as the dependent variable in the various models herein. 
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Figure 4.1. Average AFFINITY for thirty U.S. dyads 
This figure originally appeared in Bearce and Bondanella (2007). 
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4.1.2 Key Independent Variables 
To test the various hypotheses, I have coded all IGO-years for the period 1970-1995 based on the 
various attributes hypothesized to be conducive to interest convergence6 and then created various 
measures based on joint IGO membership.  The descriptions of these IGO variables are 
summarized in Table 4.2 for ease of reference. 
 
Table 4.2. List of IGO Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Variable Description 
High Structures IGO Membership Number of IGOs with more than nine total substructures in 
which two states share membership 
Joint IGO  Substructures Total number of substructures of all IGOs in which two 
states share membership 
Ministerial Bodies Total number of substructures that bring together  
ministers/heads of cabinet agencies of all member states of 
all IGOs in which two states share membership 
Secretariat and Technical 
Divisions  
Total number of secretariat and technical divisions of all 
IGOs in which two states share membership 
High Issue IGO Membership Total number of IGOs that cover more than two main issue 
areas in which two states share membership 
High Economic Issue IGO 
Membership 
Total number of IGOs that cover more than two economic 
issues in which two states share membership 
High overall issue IGO 
Membership 
Total Number of IGOs that cover both more than two main 
issue categories and more than two economic issues in 
which two states share membership 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the more IGOs with a high number of substructures to which two 
states belong, the more these states should experience interest convergence over time.   In order 
to test this hypothesis, I created two different measures.  First, I generated a count of the number 
of IGOs with more than nine substructures to which two states jointly belong (HIGH STRUCTURES 
                                                 
6 For detailed information on how IGOs were coded, see Appendix A. 
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IGO MEMBERSHIP).7  Substructures that were counted here include all of the main organs of the 
IGO as well as committees, sub-committees, working groups, and secretariat and technical 
divisions.8  If individuals from different member states interact more within IGOs with more 
structures, which results in a greater convergence in their interests over time, then the more such 
IGOs within which two states belong, the more their interests should be expected to converge 
over time. 
I created the aforementioned variable to count joint membership in IGOs that meet 
certain criteria because my theory states that IGOs with more substructures should be more 
conducive to member state interest convergence.  However, there are many ways in which one 
could define a “high” number of substructures and it is necessary to choose one in order to count 
joint IGO memberships with a dyad-year unit of analysis.  But since my theory is essentially 
about the amount of interaction between two states within IGOs, this can be captured by pooling 
the different structures together.  I thus also coded a variable that counts the total number of 
substructures of all IGOs to which the two states jointly belong.  This measure (JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES) more accurately captures variation between dyad-years in terms of the number 
of structures within which they interact, but is not a count of IGOs themselves since the 
substructures of all IGOs to which two states belong are pooled together in the measure.  
Substructures that were counted for this variable include all of the main organs of the IGO as 
well as committees, sub-committees, working groups, and secretariat and technical divisions.9  If 
my theory is correct, then the more individuals from two states interact within IGO substructures, 
the more their interests should be expected to converge over time. 
                                                 
7 IGO-years with more than five substructures account for about 20% of the IGOs in the dataset.   
8 For more detailed information, see Appendix A. 
9 For more detailed information, see Appendix A. 
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In addition to the proposition that more interaction leads to more opportunities for 
persuasion and thus more state interest convergence over time, the next hypotheses to be tested 
in this chapter is more specific with regard to the type of substructure of IGOs that should be 
most conducive to interest convergence.  This hypotheses is based on the idea that what may be 
essential to interest convergence is interaction within IGO bodies that bring together the 
ministers of all member states who have the power to influence how their states’ interests are 
defined and ultimately to shape state policy, which is a reflection of interests (see discussion of 
interests and policy preferences in Chapter 3).   
Hypothesis 2 states that the more IGO bodies for meetings of ministers of all member 
states within which two member states’ agents interact, the more similar those two states’ 
interests should become over time.  To test this hypothesis (H2), I created a variable that counts 
the total number of bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states (MINISTERIAL BODIES) 
within IGOs in which the two states in a dyad share membership.  One should note that bodies 
for meetings of member state ministers are a subset of the total number of substructures captured 
in the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable (see Figure 4.2). 
With regard to the aforementioned variable (MINISTERIAL BODIES), it is important to note 
that the word “bodies” is used somewhat loosely here: if there is one formal IGO organ such as a 
Council, but there are two or more formations of the Council, each of which brings together 
certain ministers on a regular basis, then each formation is counted as a body.  This is the case 
not only for the European Union (EU), but also for other IGOs as diverse as the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB), and the Commonwealth.  The reason for this 
coding choice is an attempt to give each “body” equal weight in terms of the amount of 
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interaction that it facilitates.  In other words, for the MINISTERIAL BODIES variable, an IGO with a 
Council of Ministers that brings together only ministers of agriculture three times a year would 
not receive the same weight as the EU’s Council of Ministers, for which frequent meetings of 
Agriculture Ministers make up only one of up to 19 such formations in the 1990s. 
 
   
Ministerial 
Bodies 
Secretariat and 
Technical Divisions 
Joint IGO 
Substructures 
Figure 4.2.  IGO Substructures  
 
In order to test an alternative hypothesis to H2, I counted the total number of secretariat 
and technical divisions of all IGOs to which two states in a dyad jointly belong (SECRETARIAT 
AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS).  (Just as with MINISTERIAL BODIES, the substructures counted in the 
variable SECRETARIAT AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS are a subset of the total JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES variable - see Figure 4.2).  If interest convergence results mainly from 
interaction of high-level state agents, then the count of secretariat and technical divisions alone 
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should be associated with member state interest convergence to a lesser degree than interaction 
between member state ministers. 
Finally, I created a set of variables measuring joint IGO membership in IGOs covering 
high levels of issues.  First, I created a variable that measures the number of joint IGO 
memberships in IGOs covering more than two main issue categories (HIGH ISSUE IGO 
MEMBERSHIP).  These categories include: security issues, political issues, economic issues, social 
and cultural issues, environmental issues, and disaster prevention and relief.10  It is, of course, 
possible for an IGO to cover only one or two of these issue categories yet to cover many specific 
issues within those categories, thus fostering more interaction than within an IGO that covers 
three main issue categories, with less specific issues within each category.  Coding each specific 
issue for every IGO would be a monumental task, which is why, to my knowledge, no such 
dataset exists.  However, in coding the data, I found very few examples of IGOs that would 
cover more than two main issue areas without also covering many sub-issues within each of 
these, whereas most IGOs covering only one issue category, actually tend to cover less overall 
specific issues.  An example of this would be the commodities groups which obviously cover 
economic issues, but which cover issues relating to only one product.   
However, since the majority of the IGOs do cover some type of economic issue, I also 
broke down the economic issue category in order to create a variable that measures the number 
of economic issues covered by the IGO.  The HIGH ECONOMIC ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable 
measures the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs covering more than two economic 
issues.  The economic issue categories include: trade, money and banking, economic 
development, science and technology research (although a function of most IGOs is conducting 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed explanation of the issue coverage variables, see Appendices A and B. 
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some type of research, I coded IGOs for this category only if one of the IGO covers cooperation 
in scientific and technological research), commodities (coded separately from trade to indicate 
marketing, etc. for that product), and other regulatory issues (a category that captures other types 
of economic issues not covered by the other categories).   
I have no theoretical expectation that interaction on economic issues would have a greater 
impact on interest convergence than interaction to manage other types of issues, but this variable 
allows a slightly more specific coding of issue coverage.  In addition, I created a third variable 
which I label HIGH OVERALL ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, that measures the number of joint IGO 
memberships in IGOs covering both more than two main issue categories and more than two 
economic issues.  As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the HIGH OVERALL ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable 
measures the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs that fall into both the set of IGOs with a 
high coverage of the main issue categories and the set of IGOs with high economic issue 
coverage. 
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I did not pool together IGO-issues as I did with IGO-substructures for each dyad for two 
reasons.  First, while each IGO substructure more directly captures a somewhat functionally 
equivalent amount of interaction, it might be misleading to equate six one-issue IGOs with one 
IGO covering all of the main issue categories.  Issue coverage is only a proxy for the amount of 
interaction and an in-depth look at the raw data makes it clear that IGOs covering more main 
issue categories foster exponentially more interaction than a one- or two-issue IGO.  In other 
words, an IGO covering four issue areas does not foster only four times the amount of interaction 
as a one-issue IGO.  Therefore, it is more accurate to count IGOs with a high issue coverage than 
to pool together the count of issues for all of the IGOs to which two states belong.  Secondly, it is 
not necessary to pool issues to capture variation because there are only a few issue categories, 
whereas with the structure variables, there were hundreds of structures and various subsets that 
one could choose to include or not to include, making it difficult to make any kind of coding 
choice for which IGOs to include in a count variable. 
4.1.3 Control Variables11 
My statistical model includes a number of control variables.  In order to control for any 
movement in the global system that affects the similarity of interests between pairs of states 
other than that caused by interaction within IGOs, I include a variable that counts years, starting 
with 0 in 1975 and increasing by 1 with each additional year (TIME).  Theoretically, I cannot 
think of anything aside from other types of state interaction outside of IGOs that would cause a 
global convergence in interests, but I include TIME to ensure that the coefficients on the IGO 
                                                 
11 Unless otherwise specified, control variables are taken from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000). 
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variables are not simply capturing such a trend.  Since the degree to which states are integrated in 
the international system may affect the degree to which their interests converge or diverge from 
those of other states independently of their interaction within IGOs, I also include a variable 
labeled DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW, which identifies the lower number of diplomatic missions for 
the two states within the dyad-year.12  The higher the number of diplomatic missions of the state 
that has less diplomatic missions in the dyad, the more integrated the two states are in the 
international system. 
Scholars have shown domestic regime type to be a strong predictor of state interests as 
expressed through UNGA voting (see, for example, Oneal and Russett 1999).  Also, socialization 
scholars argue that domestic factors may affect the degree to which states experience 
socialization within IGOs (Beyers 2005: 933).  In order to control for the difference in domestic 
political systems within the dyad, I therefore include a measure of domestic regime difference, 
which is the absolute difference of the two overall Polity scores (Democracy – Autocracy) within 
the dyad-year (DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).   
To control for economic interactions, I include a measure of dyadic trade dependence 
(DYADIC TRADE DEPENDENCE) (Gleditsch 2002).  This variable measures the trade dependence of 
the less dependent state.  Bilateral trade dependence is total imports from the other state in the 
dyad plus total exports to that state, divided by the first state’s gross domestic product (GDP).13   
Since North-South differences have been found to affect differences in state interests 
expressed through UNGA voting (Kim and Russett 1996), I also include a measure of relative 
economic development (RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT).  Relative economic development 
                                                 
12 Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004, 20. 
13 Bearce and Bondanella (2007) also experimented with other trade specifications, including the sum of state 1 and 
state 2’s trade/GDP ratios.  All of these specifications produced a similar statistical result. 
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is simply the GDP per capita of the poorer state divided by the GDP per capita of the richer state 
(Gleditsch 2002).  Higher values of this variable therefore indicate more equal levels of 
economic development. 
To address realist concerns, I include two measures of relative state power.  First, I 
include a measure of relative economic size (RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE) (see Summers and 
Heston 1991; Maddison 1995).  This is the natural log of the GDP of the larger state in the dyad 
relative to the GDP of the smaller state (Gleditsch 2002).  I also include a measure of relative 
military power, which is the natural log of the more powerful state’s capabilities divided by those 
of the other state in the dyad (RELATIVE MILITARY POWER).  Each state’s capabilities are 
calculated using data from the Correlates of War’s Composite Index of National Capabilities 
(CINC) (Singer et al. 1972), which weighs equally the states’ military personnel, military 
expenditures, energy production, iron/steel production, nominal urban population, and nominal 
total population. 
Since military alliances should affect states’ interests, I control for joint military alliances 
by including a dummy variable coded 1 if the two states in the dyad had any kind of alliance 
(ententes, neutrality pacts, and defense pacts) in that year and 0 otherwise (JOINT MILITARY 
ALLIANCE) (Gibler and Sarkees 2004).  Since scholars have argued that national interests and 
therefore UNGA voting patterns have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War (Kim 
and Russett 1996)14, I also include a dummy variable coded 1 for all dyad-years prior to 1991 
and 0 otherwise.   
To control for geopolitical factors as well as the possibility of spatial diffusion (i.e. the 
diffusion of ideas between neighbors that may affect how they define their interests) I also 
                                                 
14 Bearce and Bondanella (2007) found a significant positive relationship between the Cold War years and dyadic 
interest similarity. 
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include a variable coded 1 if the two states in the dyad are contiguous and 0 otherwise 
(CONTIGUITY). 
4.1.4 Model Specification 
The base model for each hypothesis test is a panel data regression with fixed dyad effects and 
robust standard errors clustered on the dyad.15  Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the 
variables in the models.  It is also important to note that the key independent variables are lagged 
by five years for both theoretical and methodological reasons.  Since I seek to explain state 
interest convergence, it makes sense that I look at the effect that membership in IGOs with 
certain institutional attributes has on interest similarity five years later.  As discussed in Chapter 
3, the acceptance of new ideas is expected to occur as the result of repeated meetings over long 
periods of time, which is consistent with theories of socialization discussed in Chapter 2 
(Checkel 2005: 807).  Therefore, I expect the effects of interaction to take several years to be 
reflected in state interests.  Indeed, when looking at the effects of structured IGOs on interest 
convergence, Bearce and Bondanella (2007) illustrated that the IGO effect increased with each 
additional time lag up to four years. 
With regard to methodological considerations, it is important to use a long time-lag in 
order to avoid results that could be contaminated by reverse causality.  Without a lag, one could 
argue that any supportive findings can be explained by the fact that states with more similar 
interests are more likely to form or join the same IGOs.  While it is typical to use a one-year time 
                                                 
15 Fixed effects were used to control for factors specific to certain dyads that may affect interest convergence.  A 
Hausman test also showed that this is the appropriate modeling choice. 
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lag to deal with potential problems of endogeneity, it is more appropriate to use a longer time lag 
in the models presented here for the reasons specified above. 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Affinityt 0.700 0.301 -0.947 1 
High Structures IGO 
Membership (t-5) 
10.23 3.04 0 32 
Joint IGO  Substructures  
(t-5) 
606.75 152.41 0 1773 
Ministerial Bodies (t-5) 1.19 2.47 0 37 
Secretariat and Technical 
Divisions (t-5) 
164.78 63.91 0 451 
High Issue IGO Membership 
(t-5) 
3.55 1.24 0 13 
High Economic Issue IGO 
Membership (t-5) 
5.24 1.32 0 13 
High overall issue IGO 
Membership (t-5) 
3.15 0.80 0 8 
Time 13.15 4.81 5 21 
Diplomatic Missions Low 33.19 22.57 1 146 
Domestic Political 
Difference 
8.12 6.96 0 20 
Dyadic Trade 0.0005 0.0031 0 0.166 
Relative Economic 
Development 
1.23 0.87 0.000004 4.784 
Relative Economic Size 2.15 1.60 0.000048 9.802 
Relative Military Power 2.02 1.51 0 9.00 
Joint Military Alliance 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Cold War 0.94 0.23 0 1 
Contiguity 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
I also include a lagged dependent variable (AFFINITYt-1) on the right-hand side of the 
statistical model in order to control for any temporal dependence.  Despite arguments against 
including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) (e.g. Achen 2001), it makes sense to include the 
LDV here for several reasons.  First, I expect past values of AFFINITY to have a substantive effect 
on current values of AFFINITY and therefore it is more appropriate to treat the substance of the 
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temporal processes rather than the nuisance (Beck and Katz 1996).  Second, the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable makes this a conditional change model, which is equivalent to a 
partial adjustment model (Finkel 1995: 10-11).  A partial adjustment model is appropriate when 
some unknown target value (Y*t) for the dependent variable is assumed to be accounted for by 
the explanatory variables.  In this case, the change in Y, which is equivalent to Yt-Yt-1, differs to 
some extent from the difference between the lagged dependent variable and the target value (Y*t-
Yt-1) and so the change in Y in each time period is only a partial adjustment of the difference 
between the actual value and the target value.  Because I theorize that interaction within IGOs 
leads to a convergence in how two states define their interests, but that this process takes time to 
show effects in the similarity of their expressed interests, there is likely to be inertia and in each 
year between t-1 and t, we should only see a partial adjustment toward that unknown value.  (For 
an example of a partial adjustment model in IR, see Braumoeller 2008).  Therefore the 
conditional change model is the appropriate model given my theory.   
4.2 FINDINGS 
4.2.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the models used to test Hypothesis 1, which states that the more 
IGOs with a high number of substructures to which two states both belong, the more their 
interests will converge over time.  The base model is laid out in Equation 4.1 below, with HIGH 
STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP as the key independent variable. 
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Equation 4.1 
AFFINITYXT = B0 + B1*AFFINITYXT-1 + B2* HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIPXT-5  
+ B3*TIME + B4*DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW + B5*DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCEXT 
+ B6*DYADIC TRADEXT + B7*RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTXT  
+ B8*RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZEXT + B9*RELATIVE MILITARY POWERXT  
+ B10*JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCEXT + B11*COLD WARXT + B12* CONTIGUITYX + ux + ext. 
 
For this first test of Hypothesis 1, I use a measure of joint IGO memberships in IGOs that 
have more than nine substructures.  The results for Model 1 (listed in Table 4.4) provide support 
for the hypothesis that membership in more IGOs with a high number of substructures should 
lead to greater interest convergence between two states five years later.  The coefficient for HIGH 
STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant (0.00058).  Multiplying that 
coefficient by the standard deviation for this variable produces a substantive effect of 0.0018, 
meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the number of joint memberships in IGOs with 
more than nine substructures leads to a 0.0018 increase in the change in interest similarity five 
years later.  Although this substantive effect may seem small, there are a few reasons why the 
effect is not insignificant.  First, one should note that the dependent variable ranges only from -1 
to 1.  Also, the other variables in the model are similarly small in terms of their substantive 
effects.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in dyadic trade is associated with a 
0.0021 increase in AFFINITY.  Relative capabilities has the strongest substantive effect with a 
0.021 increase in AFFINITY associated with a one standard deviation increase in relative military 
power. 
It is important to note that the theory put forth in Chapter 3 is not meant to replace Realist 
or Institutionalist theory.  Like Liberal Institutionalist scholars, I do not question the explanatory 
power of Realist factors such as military power, but I seek to complement Institutionalist theory 
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by adding one more pathway through which IGOs also influence state behavior.  The fact that 
the HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP variable holds up in the face of so many important 
control variables, provides strong support for the hypothesis that states that belong to more IGOs 
with a high number of substructures will experience greater interest convergence over time, 
rather than the null hypothesis that this joint membership has no significant effect.  Therefore, 
the results of Model 1 provide support for the theory that more interaction within IGOs leads to 
greater interest convergence. 
All of the control variables in Model 1 achieve statistical significance, with the exception 
of CONTIGUITY.  The coefficient on the TIME variable is negative and statistically significant, 
which would indicate that there is a global divergence in interest similarity, controlling for all 
other factors in the model. As stated above, I do not have any theoretical reason why there would 
be any global movement in interest similarity over time independent of interaction between 
states in the system, which is precisely what I am trying to capture with a theoretical variable: 
IGO interaction. However, I included the TIME variable in order to be conservative and assuage 
any worries that my IGO variables are capturing a positive time trend.  
The coefficient for the DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW variable is negative and statistically 
significant, which indicates that the more the states in a given dyad are integrated in the 
international system, the more their interests diverge.  If there is some omitted variable causing a 
global divergence in interests over time, then it makes sense that states that are more integrated 
in the system will experience divergence over time. 
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Table 4.4. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.183** 
(0.007) 
0.161** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
High Structures IGO Membership (t-5) 0.00058** 
(0.00026) 
 
Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)  0.000064** 
(0.000006) 
Time -0.00072** 
(0.00013) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00086** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00089** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political Difference -0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00095** 
(0.00011) 
Dyadic Trade 0.681** 
(0.341) 
0.603* 
(0.340) 
Relative Economic Development -0.0034** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0018 
(0.0016) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0072** 
(0.0014) 
0.0069** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.024** 
(0.001) 
0.027** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.0022 
(0.0110) 
-0.0022 
(0.0111) 
   
N 145,888 145,888 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.95 0.96 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.   
* indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.    
** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.    
 
The coefficient for DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE is negatively signed, which indicates 
that dyads with more distant regime types are less likely to experience interest convergence over 
time.  This finding is consistent with the proposition that states that are already have similar 
values will experience even greater interest convergence over time than other pairs of states.  The 
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coefficient for RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT indicates that dyads with more equal levels of 
economic development are less likely to converge in their interests over time.  The negative sign 
could indicate that the explanatory power of this variable is captured by the RELATIVE ECONOMIC 
SIZE variable.  Indeed, in several of the subsequent models, the coefficient for RELATIVE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance.  The RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE and 
RELATIVE MILITARY POWER variables have positive coefficients, indicating that greater disparity 
in economic and military capabilities leads to greater levels of interest convergence over time.  
This is not surprising, given that these variables are included to control for any interest 
convergence resulting from coercion.  A higher number of military alliances between two states 
is also associated with greater interest convergence over time, as indicated by the positive 
coefficient for JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE.  Finally the COLD WAR dummy has a positive 
coefficient, indicating that interest convergence is greater during the Cold War years.  
In order to more accurately capture variation in the number of substructures within which 
each pair of states interact in each year, I run a second test of H1, using a measure of the total 
number of IGO substructures within which two states interact.  The base model is the same as 
that laid out in Equation 4.1, except the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable is substituted for 
HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP. The results for Model 2 (listed in Table 4.4) also provide 
support for the hypothesis that interaction within more IGO substructures leads to interest 
convergence over time.  The coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES is positive and 
statistically significant and a one standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 
0.0098 increase in AFFINITY.  This substantive effect is higher than that of the HIGH STRUCTURES 
IGO MEMBERSHIP variable, used in Model 1, which is likely due to the more accurate variation 
captured in this second measure.  None of the coefficients for the control variables in Model 2 
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change signs from the first model and only RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical 
significance. 
4.2.2 Testing Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 states that the more bodies for ministers of all member states that exist within IGOs 
to which two states jointly belong, the more those two states interests can be expected to 
converge over time.  Hypothesis 2 is tested in Model 3.  The results for Model 3 (listed in Table 
4.5) provide support for the hypothesis that the more bodies within which member state ministers 
interact, the more two states interests will converge.  The coefficient for the MINISTERIAL BODIES 
variable is positive as expected (0.00029) and achieves statistical significance within the 90% 
confidence interval.  A one standard deviation increase in the number of structures for meetings 
of ministers is associated with a 0.0007 unit increase in the similarity of the two states’ interests.  
This substantive effect is considerably smaller than that of the IGO variables tested in the other 
models.  Therefore, it is possible that, while Hypothesis 2 is supported, the idea that meetings of 
ministers would be more important than other IGO bodies for the translation of new ideas taken 
on at the IGO level into the definition of interests at the domestic level is incorrect.  Interaction 
within other bodies of IGOs must also be important in leading to state interest convergence.  This 
would be consistent with much of the socialization literature, which focuses on the transmission 
of ideas between individuals from different states interacting with IGO secretariats and technical 
bodies.  
In Model 4, I therefore test the effects of interaction within SECRETARIAT AND TECHNICAL 
DIVISIONS on interest similarity.  The results of Model 4 (listed in Table 4.5) show that the 
number of secretariat and technical divisions of IGOs to which two states belong has a positive 
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and statistically significant impact on the degree to which the two states’ interests converge over 
time (0.000085).  The substantive impact (coefficient*standard error) of the SECRETARIAT AND 
TECHNICAL DIVISIONS variable is 0.0054.  Therefore, it is seems that both bodies for meetings of 
high-level state agents and interaction of lower level bureaucrats and experts have an impact on 
the degree to which member state interests converge over time.  In order to assess the effect of 
the various IGO variables comparatively, I include both MINISTERIAL BODIES and SECRETARIAT 
AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS in Model 5.  In this model, while both IGO variables remain 
positively signed, MINISTERIAL BODIES loses its statistical significance, again indicating that IGO 
substructures for meetings of high-level leaders are not the most conducive to member state 
interest convergence. 
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Table 4.5. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H2) 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.161** 
(0.007) 
0.188** 
(0.007) 
0.184** 
(0.007) 
0.184** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.708** 
(0.006) 
0.708** 
(0.006) 
0.708** 
(0.006) 
Joint IGO 
Substructures (t-5) 
0.000064** 
(0.000006) 
   
Ministerial Bodies (t-5)  0.00029* 
(0.00017) 
 0.000034 
(0.000174) 
Secretariat and 
Technical Divisions (t-
5) 
  0.000085** 
(0.000024) 
0.000084** 
(0.000024) 
Time -0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00054** 
(0.00008) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0003) 
Diplomatic Missions 
Low 
-0.00089** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00084** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00088** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00088** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political 
Difference 
-0.00095** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
Dyadic Trade 0.603* 
(0.340) 
0.672** 
(0.343) 
0.669** 
(0.342) 
0.667* 
(0.344) 
Relative Economic 
Development 
-0.0018 
(0.0016) 
-0.0036** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0034** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0034** 
(0.0015) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0069** 
(0.0014) 
0.0072** 
(0.0014) 
0.0073** 
(0.0014) 
0.0073** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military 
Power 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.060** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.027** 
(0.001) 
0.023** 
(0.001) 
0.026** 
(0.002) 
0.026** 
(0.002) 
Contiguity -0.0022 
(0.0111) 
-0.0020 
(0.0113) 
-0.0024 
(0.0111) 
-0.0023 
(0.0111) 
     
N 145,888 145,888 145,888 145,888 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are coefficients generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard 
errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.  *indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.   ** 
indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence. 
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4.2.3 Testing Hypothesis 3 
So far I have presented tests of the first two hypotheses relating to the various substructures of 
IGOs in which two states share membership as indicators of the amount of interaction that two 
states experience within IGOs.  Another indicator of the amount of interaction that occurs within 
IGOs is the issue coverage of the IGO, since IGOs covering more issues necessitate more 
interaction.  Hypothesis 3 states that the more IGOs with a high issue coverage in which two 
states share membership, the more their interests will converge over time. 
In Model 6 (listed in Table 4.6), I replaced the IGO structures variable from Equation 4.1 
with HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, which counts the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs 
covering more than two main issue categories.  The results for Model 6 provide support for 
Hypothesis 3.  The coefficient for HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically 
significant (0.0024) and a one standard deviation increase in the number of joint memberships in 
IGOs covering more than two issues is associated with a 0.0030 increase in AFFINITY.  The other 
variables in the model retain the same sign and statistical significance as most of the previous 
models. 
In Model 7, I substituted the HIGH ECONOMIC ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable as the key 
independent variable.  The results for this model are very similar to those of Model 6.  The 
coefficient for HIGH ECONOMIC ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant and 
the substantive effect is almost identical to that that of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, which is 
based on main issue categories rather than economic issues.  I do not believe this necessarily has 
something to do with the fact of these being economic issues rather than sub-issues of one of the 
other main categories, but rather the result is an indication that this more specific coding 
accurately captures joint membership in IGOs that foster more interaction. 
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Next, I substituted the measure that counts only IGOs that meet both the criterion that it 
cover more than two main issue categories and the criterion that it cover more than two 
economic issues.  This variable, HIGH OVERALL ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, is the key independent 
variable in Model 8 in Table 4.6, and should be the best indicator of IGOs that promote more 
interaction because it counts only IGOs that cover several main issue categories and several 
specific issues within the most frequently occuring issue category in the dataset.  The results for 
Model 8 provide additional support for Hypothesis 3 as the coefficient for HIGH OVERALL ISSUE 
IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant (0.0032). 
The results of the aforementioned tests provide support for the hypothesis that joint 
membership in IGOs that cover a high number of issues are conducive to member state interest 
convergence over time.  This is robust to three different indicators of joint membership in IGOs 
with high issue coverage. 
 77 
Table 4.6.  Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H3) 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 0.179** 
(0.007) 
0.177** 
(0.007) 
0.178** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.708** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
High Issue IGO Membership 
(t-5) 
0.0024** 
(0.0005) 
  
High Economic Issue IGO 
Membership (t-5) 
 0.0023** 
(0.0004) 
 
High overall issue IGO 
Membership (t-5) 
  0.0032** 
(0.0006) 
Time -0.00071** 
(0.00009) 
-0.00067** 
(0.00009) 
-0.00064** 
(0.00008) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00085** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00087** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00086** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political 
Difference 
-0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
Dyadic Trade 0.677** 
(0.341) 
0.688** 
(0.341) 
0.687** 
(0.341) 
Relative Economic 
Development 
-0.0028* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0029* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0028** 
(0.0016) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0071** 
(0.0014) 
0.0072** 
(0.0014) 
0.0071** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.062** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.025** 
(0.001) 
0.024** 
(0.001) 
0.024** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.0037 
(0.0114) 
-0.0032 
(0.0112) 
-0.0035 
(0.0110) 
    
N 145,888 145,888 145,888 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.96 0.95 0.95 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are coefficients generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard 
errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.   ** 
indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.  
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4.2.4 Robustness Check 
Table 4.7 reproduces the results of Model 2 from Table 4.4 along with two other tests using the 
JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable.  In Model 9, I restricted the sample to those dyad-years for 
which the AFFINITY score was neither -1, which indicates perfect dissimilarity, nor 1, which 
indicates perfect affinity.  As discussed in Chapter 3, it is important to control for strategic 
behavior when examining a state’s expressed interests.  Although, as I explained above, AFFINITY 
is an appropriate measure of state interest similarity, I present these results in order to illustrate 
that the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable can still explain increases in interest similarity when 
controlling for possible cases of bloc voting in the sample.  All of the other IGO variables retain 
their sign and substantive significance in this model, although I only present the results for the 
JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable, since it is the most inclusive measure of the number of IGO 
substructures within which two member states interact. The results for Model 9 confirm that 
interaction within more IGO substructures has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
dyadic interest similarity. 
The coefficients for the various control variables remain relatively stable, although the 
coefficient for RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance.   The coefficient 
on the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable even remains positive and statistically significant even 
after restricting the sample to cases in which the AFFINITY score is between -0.7 and 0.7, 
therefore eliminating cases that come close to the extremes (Model 10).  While Model 10 is 
obviously not the best model given that the sample was restricted based on values of the 
dependent variable, it indicates not only that the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable retains its 
significance in the absence of bloc voting but also that it does so in a much smaller sample, 
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whereas the RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and DYADID TRADE variables lose their 
statistical significance in this model. 
 
Table 4.7. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence 
 Model 2 
(Base model) 
Model 9 
(With restricted 
sample) 
Model 10 
(With restricted 
sample) 
Constant 0.161** 
(0.007) 
0.163** 
(0.007) 
0.028** 
(0.014) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.647** 
(0.010) 
Joint IGO Substructures (t-5) 0.000064** 
(0.000006) 
0.000057** 
(0.000006) 
0.000050** 
(0.000016) 
Time -0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0026** 
(0.0004) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00089** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00088** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00063** 
(0.00006) 
Domestic Political Difference -0.00095** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00104** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00172** 
(0.00021) 
Dyadic Trade 0.603* 
(0.340) 
0.587* 
(0.316) 
-0.702 
(0.779) 
Relative Economic Development -0.0018 
(0.0016) 
-0.0030* 
(0.0015) 
0.000047 
(0.00429) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0069** 
(0.0014) 
0.0066** 
(0.0014) 
0.0116** 
(0.0040) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.002) 
0.036** 
(0.004) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.063** 
(0.007) 
0.100** 
(0.011) 
Cold War 0.027** 
(0.001) 
0.031** 
(0.001) 
0.035** 
(0.002) 
Contiguity -0.0022 
(0.0111) 
-0.0026 
(0.0117) 
-0.1205** 
(0.0026) 
    
N 145,888 144,260 53,566 
R2 within 0.51 0.52 0.49 
R2 between 0.96 0.96 0.64 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 0.64 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.   
* indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.     
** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.    
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I present the findings of tests of the three hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3 
regarding which IGO attributes make them conducive to member state interest convergence.  The 
theory is based on the proposition that IGOs that facilitate more interaction between individuals 
from different member states are more conducive to an increase in member state interest 
similarity over time.  The first hypothesis derived from that proposition is that IGOs with more 
substructures are more conducive to member state interest convergence over time.  The second 
hypothesis is based on the same logic as the first, but specifies that high-level state agents are the 
most likely to transmit new ideas to the domestic context that actually translate into changes in 
state interest definition.  Based on that idea, Hypothesis 2 states that the more bodies for 
ministers of all member states of IGOs to which two states jointly belong, the more interest 
convergence they would experience over time.  The third hypothesis states that joint membership 
in IGOs that cover a high number of issues should be more conducive to member state interest 
convergence over time. 
I tested each of these hypotheses separately in panel data regressions with fixed effects 
and robust standard errors clustered on the dyad, using Gartzke’s AFFINITY measure as an 
indicator of member state interest similarity.  In order to test the four hypotheses, I created an 
original IGO dataset and generated several dyadic measures based on joint membership in IGOs 
with various attributes. 
All of the hypotheses regarding IGO attributes and the degree to which IGOs with those 
attributes is associated with increases in member state interest similarity are supported by the 
results of the respective tests used to determine their validity.  The substantive significance of 
these IGO variables is similar in magnitude to that of other variables in the different models.  
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While the magnitude of the substantive effect of the IGO variables is surpassed by some of the 
realist and institutionalist control variables, this does not weaken support for the theory being 
tested here, which was never meant to replace material factors as an explanation for changes in 
state interests.  Rather, the point of this project is to add another important factor back into the 
equation – interaction within IGOs and the resulting changes in ideas that affect the definition of 
state interests – and furthermore to determine which attributes of IGOs make this process most 
likely.   
As expected, the results indicate that IGOs with a high number of substructures as well as 
those with a lot of bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states are positively related 
with increases in member state interest similarity.  Surprisingly, the number of secretariat and 
technical divisions of IGOs to which two states share membership is also positively related with 
interest convergence and has a greater substantive impact on interest similarity than the number 
of bodies for meetings of member state ministers.   
Tests of Hypothesis 3 provide strong support for the notion that IGOs covering more 
issue areas are conducive to member state interest convergence over time.  The results are robust 
to several specifications of issue coverage.  The theory set forth herein is that IGOs that foster 
greater interaction between member states are conducive to member state interest convergence 
on the whole because they provide more opportunities for individuals from various member 
states to interact and therefore to transmit ideas to one another that may be translated into a more 
similar definition of state interests.  The various tests provided in this chapter provide support for 
that theory. 
Finally, I restricted the sample in order to ensure that these results would hold up while 
controlling for any possibility of bloc voting that could be reflected in the AFFINITY variable.  As 
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discussed in Chapter 3, one can use expressed interests as an indicator of interests as long as one 
controls for strategic behavior.  Therefore, I restricted the sample to exclude cases of extreme 
dissimilarity and of extreme similarity and the coefficients for all of the IGO variables remain 
positive and statistically significant, although I presented only the results for the most inclusive 
and detailed measure of the number of IGO substructures within which two states interact.  
These tests also demonstrate that the IGO variables retain their statistical significance in a 
smaller sample. 
The findings of the aforementioned tests are largely supportive of my theory that more 
interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence over time and that IGOs with more 
substructures and/or higher issue coverage are therefore more conducive to member state interest 
convergence.  In Chapter 5, I will test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3 regarding the 
conditional effects of state and dyadic attributes on the degree to which new ideas are spread 
through persuasion between agents of different states and the degree to which those ideas lead to 
a redefinition of state interests, making two states more similar in their interests as a result of 
interaction within IGOs. 
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5.0  TESTING THE CONDITIONING EFFECTS OF DYADIC ATTRIBUTES 
This dissertation asks which attributes of IGOs are conducive to member state interest 
convergence.  In Chapter 3, I put forth a theory based on the proposition that IGOs that foster 
greater interaction between member states should lead to greater interest convergence.  Based on 
that proposition I made three hypotheses regarding IGO attributes associated with greater 
interaction and tested them in Chapter 4.  The findings from Chapter 4 generally support the 
hypotheses that IGOs with more substructures and those with greater issue coverage are 
associated with interest convergence between member states over time.  While the those 
hypotheses represent the crux of my theory, I also address, in Chapter 3, the possibility that the 
effects of intra-IGO interaction on changes in state interests may not be the same for every pair 
of states.  In that chapter, I also proposed that, for states that already share some common 
attributes, the effect of interacting within IGOs with the aforementioned attributes should be 
greater than for other dyads.  I then made three hypotheses regarding the conditional effects of 
dyadic attributes on the degree to which interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest 
convergence over time.  These hypotheses (listed in Table 5.1 for ease of reference) state that 
intra-IGO interaction should lead to greater interest convergence between pairs of states that are 
both liberal democracies, between pairs of states that are closer together on the 
democracy/autocracy scale, and between pairs of states that share common cultural attributes 
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such as language, ethnicity, and religion.  In this chapter, I present a series of tests of these 
hypotheses, discuss the findings, and draw some conclusions from these findings. 
 
Table 5.1. List of Hypotheses regarding Conditional Effects of Dyadic Attributes 
Label Hypothesis  
H4 
The effect of joint membership in more IGOs with attributes that are conducive to 
interest convergence should have a greater effect on interest similarity for dyads 
in which both states are liberal democracies. 
H5 
The closer together two states are on the democracy/autocracy scale, the more 
their interests should converge over time as a result of joint membership in IGOs 
with attributes that are conducive to interest convergence. 
H6 
The effects of being jointly members of more IGOs with attributes that are 
conducive to interest convergence should be greater for two states with a 
common language, ethnicity, and/or religion. 
 
5.1 EMPIRICAL TESTS 
In this section, I will discuss the statistical models that will be used to test the remaining 
hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3.  As with the models in Chapter 4, the unit of analysis is dyad-
year and the sample includes all dyad-years for the period 1975-1991.  Since these hypotheses 
set expectations regarding the conditional effects of dyadic attributes on the degree to which 
interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence, the models herein include 
interaction terms using two of the key IGO variables from Chapter 4.  I focus on the JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES and HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variables, since these represent the main 
operationalizations of the two key attributes of IGOs: the number of joint IGO substructures and 
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the number of IGOs covering more than two issue areas within which the two states interact.  
The findings are generally the same for the other key IGO variables in Chapter 4.16 
5.1.1 New Variables 
I introduce eight new measures of dyadic attributes to be used in interaction with the IGO 
variables in order to test Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6.  These variables and their descriptions are listed 
in Table 5.2 for ease of reference.  Hypothesis 4 states that dyads in which both states are liberal 
democracies will experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs.  
As a measure of whether the two states in a dyad are both liberal democracies, I created a 
dummy variable coded 1 if both states in the dyad have an overall Polity score (Democracy – 
Autocracy) of 7 or higher and 0 otherwise (JOINT DEMOCRACY) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).  
Although Hypothesis 4 is specifically about joint liberal democracies, I also use a measure of 
joint autocracies in order to distinguish the effects of IGO interaction on joint autocracies from 
those of mixed dyads.17  This variable is coded 1 if the two states in a dyad both have an overall 
Polity score of -7 or below (JOINT AUTOCRACY) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). 
 
                                                 
16 Results available upon request. 
17 The omitted category actually includes both dyads with one democracy and one autocracy and any dyads 
involving states that fall between -6 and 6, but I will refer to these as mixed dyads from this point forward. 
 86 
Table 5.2. List of Dyadic Attribute Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Variable Description 
Joint Democracy Coded 1 if both states in a dyad have a Polity score 
(Democracy-Autocracy) of 7 or higher and coded 0 
otherwise 
Joint Autocracy Coded 1 if both states in a dyad have a Polity score of -7 or 
lower and coded 0 otherwise 
Domestic Political Difference Absolute value of the difference between the two states 
overall Polity scores 
Common Culture (dichotomous) Coded 1 if the two states in a dyad share any of the 
following cultural attributes: language, ethnicity, and 
religion. 
Common Cultural Attributes (ordinal) The total number of cultural attributes that the two states in 
the dyad share, including common language, ethnicity and 
religion. 
Common Language Coded 1 if the largest linguistic group of the two states is 
the same and 0 otherwise 
Common Ethnicity Coded 1 if the largest ethnic group of the two states is the 
same and 0 otherwise 
Common Religion Coded 1 if the largest religious group of the two states is 
the same and 0 otherwise 
 
Based on the notion from reference group theory that actors give serious consideration to 
information from other actors they deem to be in their peer group, Hypothesis 5 states that the 
closer together the regime types of two states, the more intra-IGO interaction will lead to interest 
convergence.  In order to test this hypothesis, I employ the DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE 
variable from Chapter 4, which is created using Polity data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).  
However, as will be noted in the discussion of the models below, I lag the variable five years in 
order to interact it with the IGO variables, which are lagged five years.  If it takes about five 
years for the effects of interaction within IGOs to affect the change in state interest similarity 
from time t-1 to time t, then an expectation that this effect will be greater if those two states are 
closer together on the Polity scale requires that one examine their domestic political difference at 
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the same time of the interaction.  Since all component parts of an interaction must also appear 
separately in the model, this control variable will also be lagged five years.18 
Hypothesis 6 states that dyads in which the two states share cultural attributes such as 
language, ethnicity, and religion will experience greater interest convergence as a result of 
interaction within IGOs.  To test this hypothesis, I created five different variables using data 
from Ellingsen (1995, 2000).  First, I created a dichotomous variable for common language, 
which I coded 1 if the largest linguistic group as a percentage of the population of the state is the 
same for both states and 0 otherwise (COMMON LANGUAGE).  I created a similar variable, which is 
coded 1 if the largest ethnic group of both states is the same and 0 otherwise (COMMON 
ETHNICITY).  The third variable is coded 1 if the largest religious group of both states is the same 
and 0 otherwise (COMMON RELIGION).  Using these variables, I then created a fourth variable 
which is coded 1 if the dyad scores a 1 on any of the three aforementioned variables (i.e. if the 
two states share at least one of these common cultural attributes) and 0 otherwise (COMMON 
CULTURE).  Finally, I created an ordinal measure to count the number of common cultural 
attributes that the two states share based on the first three variables (COMMON CULTURAL 
ATTRIBUTES).   
5.1.2 Model Specification 
The base model for each hypothesis test is a panel data regression with fixed dyad effects and 
robust standard errors clustered on the dyad.  As in Chapter 4, the AFFINITY score is used to 
measure member state interest similarity for the dependent variable.  The models described 
                                                 
18 See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) for a good discussion of why it is important to include all component 
parts of an interaction term. 
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below also include all of the same control variables as in Equation 4.1, except that the DOMESTIC 
POLITICAL DIFFERENCE variable is excluded from the models that include JOINT DEMOCRACY 
and/or JOINT AUTOCRACY to avoid problems of multicollinearity.19  The descriptive statistics for 
all of the variables are listed in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Affinityt 0.700 0.301 -0.947 1 
Joint IGO  Substructures  
(t-5) 
606.75 152.41 0 1773 
High Issue IGO Membership 
(t-5) 
3.55 1.24 0 13 
Joint Democracy (t-5) 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Joint Autocracy (t-5) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Domestic Political 
Difference (t-5) 
7.94 6.99 0 20 
Common Culture  (t-5) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Common Cultural Traits  
(t-5) 
0.44 0.64 0 3 
Common Language (t-5) 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Common Religion (t-5) 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Common Ethnicity (t-5) 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Time 13.15 4.81 5 21 
Diplomatic Missions Low 33.19 22.57 1 146 
Domestic Political 
Difference 
8.12 6.96 0 20 
Dyadic Trade 0.0005 0.0031 0 0.166 
Relative Economic 
Development 
1.23 0.87 0.000004 4.784 
Relative Economic Size 2.15 1.60 0.000048 9.802 
Relative Military Power 2.02 1.51 0 9.00 
Joint Military Alliance 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Cold War 0.94 0.23 0 1 
Contiguity 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of the variables used in the baseline models, see Chapter 4. 
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5.2 FINDINGS 
5.2.1 Testing Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 states that joint liberal democracies should experience greater interest convergence 
as a result of interaction within IGOs.  Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the results from a series of tests 
of Hypothesis 5.  The first test of this hypothesis is Model 1, which is specified in Equation 5.1: 
 
Equation 5.1 
AFFINITYXT = B0 + B1*AFFINITYXT-1 + B2* JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5  
+  B3*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5*JOINT DEMOCRACYXT-5  
+ B4*JOINT DEMOCRACYXT-5 + B5*TIME + B6*DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW  
+ B7*DYADIC TRADEXT + B8*RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTXT  
+ B9*RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZEXT + B10*RELATIVE MILITARY POWERXT  
+ B11*JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCEXT + B12*COLD WARXT + B13* CONTIGUITYX + ux + ext. 
 
As noted above, the JOINT DEMOCRACY variable and both components of the interaction between 
JOINT DEMOCRACY and JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES are lagged five years for both methodological 
and theoretical reasons.20 
                                                 
20 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the five-year time lag. 
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Table 5.4. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H4) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.153** 
(0.007) 
0.158** 
(0.007) 
0.157** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.705** 
(0.006) 
0.708** 
(0.006) 
0.707** 
(0.006) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5) 0.000068** 
(0.000006) 
0.000054** 
(0.000006) 
0.000057** 
(0.000006) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)* Joint 
Democracy (t-5) 
-0.000013** 
(0.000003) 
 -0.000013** 
(0.000003) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)* Joint 
Autocracy (t-5) 
 0.000029** 
(0.000002) 
0.000029** 
(0.000002) 
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO 
Structures for Joint 
Democracy=1 
0.000055** 
(0.000006) 
 0.000044** 
(0.000007) 
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO 
Structures for Joint Autocracy=1 
 0.000083** 
(0.000006) 
0.000085** 
(0.000006) 
Joint Democracy (t-5) -0.0070** 
(0.0018) 
 -0.0073** 
(0.0018) 
Joint Autocracy (t-5)  0.0047** 
(0.0010) 
0.0046** 
(0.0010) 
Time -0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0002) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00089** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00091** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00091** 
(0.00004) 
Dyadic Trade 0.670** 
(0.343) 
0.611** 
(0.341) 
0.643* 
(0.342) 
Relative Economic Development 0.00025 
(0.00156) 
-0.00043 
(0.00156) 
0.00022 
(0.00157) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0064** 
(0.0014) 
0.0064** 
(0.0014) 
0.0063** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.066** 
(0.007) 
0.063** 
(0.007) 
0.065** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.026** 
(0.001) 
0.023** 
(0.001) 
0.022** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity 0.00099 
(0.01134) 
-0.00039 
(0.01238) 
0.00005 
(0.01245) 
    
N 145,229 145,229 145,229 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.  ** indicates 
statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.   
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The results for Model 1 (listed in Table 5.4) do not provide support for Hypothesis 4.  In 
order to determine the effect of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES on member state interest similarity for 
dyads that are not joint democracies, one simply has to look at the coefficient on the JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES, which is 0.000064.  The coefficient is also positive and statistically significant, 
with a substantive effect that is very similar to the coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES in 
the models in Chapter 4.  This is the effect of joint substructures on member state interest 
similarity for joint autocracies and mixed dyads.  In order to determine the effect of JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES when the dyad is a joint democracy, one must add together the coefficients for 
both JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and the interaction term.  In Table 5.1, I have listed the 
combined coefficients for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES*JOINT 
DEMOCRACY, as well as the standard error for the combined coefficient, which is used to 
determine the statistical significance of the conditional coefficient.  The effect of JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES for dyads that are joint democracies is therefore 0.000055, which is positive and 
statistically significant.  However, counter to the expectation set forth in Hypothesis 4, this 
indicates that interaction within more joint IGO substructures actually has a lesser effect on 
interest similarity for joint democracies than it does for other dyads. 
It is possible that joint liberal democracies do not experience much interest convergence 
as a result of interaction within IGOs because they are already so close together in terms of how 
they define their interests.  However, it appears that the logic behind Hypothesis 4 is incorrect in 
that interest convergence does not require liberal-minded participants, at least in terms of the 
state having liberal democratic policies.  This will be discussed further below.  First, since the 
omitted category in Model 1 is all other dyads that are not joint democracies, one cannot 
distinguish between joint autocracies and mixed dyads in terms of whether one or the other or 
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both are experiencing a greater effect of joint IGO substructures on interest similarity.  I 
therefore test the conditional effect of joint autocracies and then put both in the same model so 
that the omitted category is simply mixed dyads. 
In Model 2, JOINT AUTOCRACY is interacted with JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES.  The 
specification of Model 2 is laid out in Equation 5.2: 
 
Equation 5.2 
AFFINITYXT = B0 + B1*AFFINITYXT-1 + B2*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5  
+ B3*JOINT AUTOCRACYXT-5  
+ B4*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5*JOINT AUTOCRACYXT-5 + B5*TIME  
+ B6*DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW + B7*DYADIC TRADEXT  
+ B8*RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTXT + B9*RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZEXT  
+ B10*RELATIVE MILITARY POWERXT + B11*JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCEXT  
+ B12*COLD WARXT + B13* CONTIGUITYX + ux + ext. 
 
The results of Model 2 indicate that joint autocracies experience greater interest 
convergence as a result of interaction with joint IGO substructures than do joint democracies and 
mixed dyads.  The coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES alone is 0.000054, which is 
statistically significant.  This is the effect of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for joint democracies and 
mixed dyads.  However, the coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for joint autocracies, which 
is the combined value of the coefficients of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and the interaction term, 
is 0.000083.  This statistically significant effect is higher than that of the other dyads.  The 
coefficients for the control variables are not significantly different from those of Model 1 or from 
those of the various models in Chapter 4, with the exception of RELATIVE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, which is not statistically significant in either Model 1 or Model 2.  It is not 
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surprising that RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance, because joint 
democracies tend to have more similar levels of economic development and therefore the 
democracy/autocracy variables may be sucking up the explanatory effects of RELATIVE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.  
In Model 3 (listed in Table 5.4) I included both JOINT DEMOCRACY and JOINT 
AUTOCRACY.  This model is laid out in Equation 5.3: 
 
Equation 5.3 
AFFINITYXT = B0 + B1*AFFINITYXT-1 + B2*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5  
+ B3*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5*JOINT DEMOCRACYXT-5  
+ B4*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5*JOINT AUTOCRACYXT-5  
+ B5*JOINT DEMOCRACYXT-5 + B6*JOINT AUTOCRACYXT-5  
+ B7*TIME + B8*DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW + B9*DYADIC TRADEXT  
+ B10*RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTXT + B11*RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZEXT  
+ B12*RELATIVE MILITARY POWERXT + B13*JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCEXT  
+ B14*COLD WARXT + B15* CONTIGUITYX + ux + ext 
 
In this model, the coefficient for the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable alone represents 
the effect of joint IGO substructures on interest similarity for mixed dyads.  The coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant (0.000057).  The coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for 
joint democracies (listed in the row marked B2+B3 in Table 5.4) is 0.000044 and statistically 
significant, but is actually lower than for mixed dyads.  Finally, the coefficient of JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES for joint autocracies (listed in the row marked B2+B4 in Table 5.4) is 0.000085, 
which is higher than that of both joint democracies and mixed dyads. 
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Table 5.5 presents the results of a series of similar tests using interactions of the JOINT 
DEMOCRACY and JOINT AUTOCRACY variables with HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP.  Model 4 is 
identical to the model presented in Equation 5.1 except that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 
substituted for the IGO variable.  In this model, the coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 
0.0027 for joint autocracies and mixed dyads and is statistically significant.  However, the 
coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for joint democracies, while lower than that for other 
dyads (0.00033), is not statistically significant.  
In Model 5, I interacted JOINT AUTOCRACY with HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, and 
therefore this model is identical to that in Equation 5.2, except that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP 
is substituted for the IGO variable.  In this model, HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with AFFINITY, which represents the effect of membership in 
IGOs with high issue coverage on interest similarity for joint democracies and mixed dyads.  For 
joint autocracies, however, the coefficient on HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 0.0021 and is 
statistically significant, which indicates that the effects of joint membership in more high issue 
coverage IGOs is lesser for joint autocracies than for joint democracies and mixed dyads. 
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Table 5.5. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H4) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 0.173** 
(0.007) 
0.172** 
(0.007) 
0.172** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.705** 
(0.006) 
0.705** 
(0.006) 
0.705** 
(0.006) 
High Issues IGO Membership (t-
5) 
0.0027** 
(0.0005) 
0.0025** 
(0.0005) 
0.0029** 
(0.0005) 
High Issue IGOs(t-5)* Joint 
Democracy (t-5) 
-0.0024** 
(0.0010) 
 -0.0026** 
(0.0010) 
High Issue IGOs(t-5)* Joint 
Autocracy (t-5) 
 -0.00041 
(0.00051) 
-0.00084 
(0.00052) 
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO 
Structures for Joint 
Democracy=1 
0.00033 
(0.00103) 
 0.00033 
(0.00103) 
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO 
Structures for Joint Autocracy=1 
 0.0021** 
(0.0006) 
0.0021** 
(0.0006) 
Joint Democracy (t-5) 0.00082 
(0.00427) 
 0.0018 
(0.0043) 
Joint Autocracy (t-5)  0.0066** 
(0.0024) 
0.0081** 
(0.0024) 
Time -0.00071** 
(0.00009) 
-0.00071** 
(0.00009) 
-0.00070** 
(0.00009) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00085** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00085** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00086** 
(0.00004) 
Dyadic Trade 0.742** 
(0.343) 
0.726** 
(0.342) 
0.748** 
(0.343) 
Relative Economic Development -0.0011 
(0.0015) 
-0.0017 
(0.0015) 
-0.0014 
(0.0015) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0061** 
(0.0014) 
0.0061** 
(0.0014) 
0.0060** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.064** 
(0.007) 
0.064** 
(0.007) 
0.064** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.025** 
(0.001) 
0.025** 
(0.001) 
0.025** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.00099 
(0.01160) 
-0.00264 
(0.01146) 
-0.0025 
(0.0115) 
    
N 146,412 146,412 146,412 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.96 0.96 0.96 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.  ** indicates 
statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence. 
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The last model in Table 5.5 (Model 6) includes interaction terms for HIGH ISSUE IGO 
MEMBERSHIP with both joint democracy and joint autocracy and is identical to the model in 
Equation 5.3, except that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is substituted for the IGO variable.  The 
results of this model are similar to those of the previous two models.  The coefficient of HIGH 
ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for joint democracies is not statistically significant, while the coefficient 
for joint autocracies is again 0.0021 and is statistically significant.  However, this model shows 
that the effect of joint membership in high issue IGOs on interest similarity is greater for mixed 
dyads than for joint autocracies as the coefficient on the HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable 
when both JOINT DEMOCRACY and JOINT AUTOCRACY are 0 is 0.0029 and is statistically 
significant. 
The results of Models 1-6 seem to indicate that dyads involving autocracies are actually 
more prone to interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs than are joint liberal 
democracies, although they provide somewhat mixed results with regard to whether mixed dyads 
or joint autocracies experience greater interest convergence due to interaction within these IGOs.  
This is a puzzling finding, but the lack of a statistically significant effect of joint IGO 
membership for joint democracies is most likely due to the fact that coherent liberal democracies 
already hold such similar ideas and values that, aside from changes in material factors, which are 
controlled for in these models, there is not much convergence that can be picked up by the IGO 
variable.  These findings may also indicate that states that are new to the international system 
(since new states tend not to be coherent liberal democracies) more rapidly take on new norms 
and ideas and therefore experience greater interest convergence over the time period of the 
sample than do other dyads.  This is an interesting finding that should be the subject of future 
research, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.2.2 Testing Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 states that the smaller the difference between two states on the democracy scale, 
the more their interests should converge as a result of interaction within IGOs.  Table 5.6 
presents the results of two tests of this hypothesis.  In Model 7, I included an interaction term for 
JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE, with both component parts 
lagged five years as discussed above.  This model is specified in Equation 5.4: 
 
Equation 5.4 
AFFINITYXT = B0 + B1*AFFINITYXT-1 + B2*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5  
+  B3*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5*DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCEXT-5  
+ B4* DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCEXT-5 + B5*TIME  
+ B6*DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW + B7* *DYADIC TRADEXT  
+ B8*RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTXT + B9*RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZEXT  
+ B10*RELATIVE MILITARY POWERXT + B11*JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCEXT  
+ B12*COLD WARXT + B13* CONTIGUITYX + ux + ext. 
 
The results of this model do not support Hypothesis 5.  While JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES 
has a positive and statistically significant effect when there is no difference in Polity scores 
(0.0000574), the coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES is actually increasing and statistically 
significant over increasing differences in the Polity scores of two states.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1.   
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Table 5.6. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H5) 
 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 0.164** 
(0.007) 
0.178** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.706** 
(0.006) 
0.705** 
(0.006) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5) 0.0000574** 
(0.000006) 
 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Domestic 
Political Diff(t-5) 
0.0000012** 
(0.000000) 
 
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5)  0.002213** 
(0.0005) 
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Domestic Political 
Diff(t-5) 
 0.000014 
(0.000044) 
Time -0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00070** 
(0.00009) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00090** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00084** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political Difference (t-5) -0.0011** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00050** 
(0.00019) 
Dyadic Trade 0.672** 
(0.341) 
0.720** 
(0.342) 
Relative Economic Development -0.00099 
(0.00154) 
-0.0017 
(0.0015) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0058** 
(0.0014) 
0.0061** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.063** 
(0.007) 
0.063** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.026** 
(0.001) 
0.025** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.00097 
(0.01141) 
-0.00304 
(0.01160) 
   
N 146,412 146,412 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.96 0.96 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.  ** indicates 
statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.   
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▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence. 
Figure 5.1. Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Substructures conditioned on Domestic Political Difference 
 
As with joint democracies, it may be that the more similar two states are in terms of their 
level of democracy, the less room there is for convergence.  However, it is interesting to note 
that, over increasing levels of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES, the negative effect of DOMESTIC 
POLITICAL DIFFERENCE on interest similarity is decreasing.  This is illustrated in Figure 5.2.  This 
means that the more IGO substructures within which two states interact, the less the differences 
in their Polity score is associated with interest divergence, indicating that interaction within IGOs 
may mediate the effects of differences between states that differ in terms of their ideas. 
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▲ Denotes statistical significance with 90% confidence.  
Figure 5.2. Marginal Effect of Domestic Political Difference Conditioned on Joint IGO Substructures 
 
In fact, as one can see from Figure 5.2, when two states interact in 1400 or more IGO 
substructures, the difference in their democracy scores is actually associated with interest 
convergence, while for cases in between dyads with more than 800, but less than 1400 joint 
substructures, DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE has no statistically significant effect.  If states 
interacting in a very high number of IGO substructures are more likely to converge and states 
that are farther apart in terms of their ideas and values have more room to converge, then this 
makes perfect sense.  In general, the more two states interact, the less their domestic political 
differences will lead them to have different interests and the more their interaction with each 
other will affect how they define their interests. 
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Model 8 is also a test of Hypothesis 5, but employs the HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP 
variable in place of the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable in Equation 5.4.  The results for this 
model lead to the same finding as Model 7.  HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is positively associated 
with interest similarity with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.002213.  As one can see 
from Figure 5.3, the conditional effect of DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE is the opposite of the 
expectation from Hypothesis 5.  The more two states differ in terms of their Polity score, the 
more their interests converge as a result of interaction within IGOs that cover more than two 
main issue areas. 
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▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence. 
Figure 5.3. Marginal Effect of High Issue IGO Membership Conditioned on Domestic Political Difference 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the conditional effect of joint membership in more IGOs with a high 
issue coverage on the effects of differences in Polity scores on interest similarity.  The marginal 
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coefficients of DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE become smaller negative numbers as HIGH ISSUE 
IGO MEMBERSHIP increases, which means that the more IGOs with a high issue coverage within 
which two states interact, the less their differences on the democracy scale lead to a divergence 
of their interests.  However, the coefficients for DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE are not 
statistically significant for cases in which two states are members of more than eight such IGOs.  
In other words, when two states are members of more than eight IGOs covering more than two 
issues, the difference in their level of democracy does not have a statistically significant effect on 
the similarity of their interests. 
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▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence. 
Figure 5.4. Marginal Effect of Domestic Political Difference conditioned on High Issue IGO Membership 
 
 103 
5.2.3 Testing Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 puts forth the expectation that states with common cultural attributes will be more 
likely to experience interest convergence the more they interact within IGOs.  Tables 5.7 through 
5.10 present the results of a series of tests of Hypothesis 6.  Model 9 in Table 5.7 includes an 
interaction between JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and COMMON CULTURE, which is a dichotomous 
variable coded 1 if the two states share any of the following attributes: largest linguistic, largest 
ethnic, or largest religious group.  Model 9 is laid out in Equation 5.5: 
 
Equation 5.5 
AFFINITYXT = B0 + B1*AFFINITYXT-1 + B2*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5  
+  B3*JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURESXT-5*COMMON CULTUREXT-5  
+ B4*COMMON CULTUREXT-5 + B5*TIME + B6*DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW  
+ B7*DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCEXT + B8*DYADIC TRADEXT  
+ B9*RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTXT + B10*RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZEXT  
+ B11*RELATIVE MILITARY POWERXT + B12*JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCEXT  
+ B13*COLD WARXT + B14* CONTIGUITYX + ux + ext. 
 
The results for Model 9 provide support for Hypothesis 6.  For states that do not share a 
common language, ethnicity, or religion, interaction within IGO substructures is positively 
associated with interest similarity with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.000062.  
However, as one can see from the row marked “B2+B3,” the coefficient of JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES for states with at least one common cultural attribute is higher than for other 
states (0.000067).  Substantively, the difference is small, with a one standard deviation increase 
in JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES associated with a 0.0094 unit increase in AFFINITY for states 
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without shared cultural attributes compared with a 0.0100 unit increase in AFFINITY for states that 
have at least one common cultural attribute.  However, it is quite interesting to note that 
COMMON CULTURE only has an effect on interest convergence by conditioning the effect of JOINT 
IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and does not on its own have a statistically significant effect on interest 
similarity at any level of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES.21  The results of this model therefore 
support Hypothesis 6, indicating that states that already have common cultural attributes may be 
more likely to take on new ideas from each other and therefore converge in how they define their 
interests as a result of interaction within IGOs.   
In order to further explore this issue, I used an ordinal measure of common culture in 
Model 10, interacting the variable COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES with JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES (Model 10 is identical to Equation 5.5, except that the ordinal variable is 
substitute for the dichotomous culture variable).  This new variable counts each common cultural 
attribute, including shared language, religion, and ethnicity and therefore it ranges from 0 to 3.  
The results of Model 10 confirm the findings from Model 9.  As one can see from Figure 5.5, the 
more common cultural attributes two states have, the more their interaction within IGO 
substructures is associated with interest convergence.  The differences, however, are again 
substantively small, given that a one standard deviation increase in with JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES for states with no shared cultural attributes is associated with 0.0096 unit 
increase in AFFINITY and for states with all three common cultural attributes, a one standard 
deviation increase in JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES results in a 0.0099 unit increase in AFFINITY. 
 
                                                 
21 Results available upon request. 
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Table 5.7. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6) 
 Model 9 Model 10 
Constant 0.163** 
(0.007) 
0.161** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5) 0.000062** 
(0.000007) 
0.000063** 
(0.000006) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common 
Culture(t-5) 
0.000005 
(0.000005) 
 
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for 
Common Culture=1 
0.000067** 
(0.000006) 
 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Ordinal 
Common Culture(t-5) 
 0.000002 
(0.000003) 
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for 
Ordinal Common Culture=1 
 0.000065** 
(0.000006) 
Common Culture (t-5) -0.0024 
(0.0040) 
 
Ordinal Common Culture (t-5)  -0.00015 
(0.00307) 
Time -0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00090** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00090** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political Difference -0.0010** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010** 
(0.001) 
Dyadic Trade 0.703* 
(0.340) 
0.623* 
(0.342) 
Relative Economic Development -0.0022 
(0.0016) 
-0.0020 
(0.0016) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0069** 
(0.0014) 
0.0068** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.060** 
(0.007) 
0.060** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.026** 
(0.001) 
0.027** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.0028 
(0.0110) 
-0.0029 
(0.111) 
   
N 144,217 143,669 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.95 0.95 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.   ** indicates 
statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.   
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▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence. 
Figure 5.5. Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Substructures conditioned on Common Cultural Attributes 
 
Next, I tested each attribute separately, to see if they would have different conditioning 
effects on the effect of intra-IGO interaction on interest similarity.  The results for these models 
can be found in Table 5.8.  The results for Model 11, which substitutes COMMON LANGUAGE in 
place of the cultural variable in Equation 5.5, indicate that states with the same largest linguistic 
group actually experience less interest convergence as a result of interaction within joint IGO 
substructures than do states that do not share the same major language.   
Model 12 shows that COMMON ETHNICITY actually has the strongest substantive 
conditioning effect on the coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES, increasing from 0.000064 for 
states whose largest ethnic groups are not the same to 0.000076 for states that have the same 
largest ethnic group.  This means that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in JOINT IGO 
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SUBSTRUCTURES is associated with a 0.0098 unit increase in AFFINITY for states without a 
common ethnicity, while this is associated with a 0.0116 unit increase for states with a common 
ethnicity. 
Finally, the results of Model 13, in which COMMON RELIGION is interacted with JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES, indicate that shared religion of the two states’ largest religious groups has a 
small, but positive effect on the degree to which states experience interest convergence as a 
result of interaction within more IGO substructures.  For states without a common religion, the 
coefficient on is 0.000063, while for states with a common religion, the coefficient is 0.000066.   
Almost all of the results thus far support Hypothesis 6, despite the relatively small 
substantive conditioning effect of the common cultural variables.  In the final set of models, I test 
the conditioning effects of these cultural variables on the effect that joint membership in IGOs 
with a high issue coverage has on member state interest similarity.  Model 14 is specified in 
Equation 5.6: 
 
Equation 5.6 
AFFINITYXT = B0 + B1*AFFINITYXT-1 + B2*HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIPXT-5  
+  B3* HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIPXT-5*COMMON CULTUREXT-5  
+ B4*COMMON CULTUREXT-5 + B5*TIME + B6*DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW  
+ B7*DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCEXT + B8*DYADIC TRADEXT  
+ B9*RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTXT + B10*RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZEXT  
+ B11*RELATIVE MILITARY POWERXT + B12*JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCEXT  
+ B13*COLD WARXT + B14* CONTIGUITYX + ux + ext. 
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Table 5.8. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6) 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Constant 0.166** 
(0.007) 
0.161** 
(0.007) 
0.161** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5) 0.000064** 
(0.000006) 
0.000064** 
(0.000006) 
0.000063** 
(0.000007) 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common 
Language (t-5) 
-0.000003 
(0.000008) 
  
Marg. Effect of Joint IGO Structures 
for Comm. Lang.=1 
0.000061** 
(0.000010) 
  
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common 
Ethnicity (t-5) 
 0.000012 
(0.000010) 
 
Marg. Effect of Joint IGO Structures 
for Comm. Ethnic.=1 
 0.000076** 
(0.000010) 
 
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common 
Religion (t-5) 
  0.000003 
(0.000005) 
Marg. Effect of Joint IGO Structures 
for Comm. Relig.=1 
  0.000066** 
(0.000006) 
Common Language (t-5) -0.083** 
(0.014) 
  
Common Ethnicity (t-5)  -0.0045 
(0.0100) 
 
Common Religion (t-5)   -0.00031 
(0.00414) 
Time -0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0002) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00089** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00091** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00089** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political Difference -0.00095** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00103** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00095** 
(0.00011) 
Dyadic Trade 0.602* 
(0.340) 
0.621* 
(0.342) 
0.602* 
(0.340) 
Relative Economic Development -0.0019 
(0.0016) 
-0.0019 
(0.0016) 
-0.0019 
(0.0016) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0068** 
(0.0014) 
0.0069** 
(0.0014) 
0.0069** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.060** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.027** 
(0.001) 
0.027** 
(0.001) 
0.027** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.0020 
(0.0111) 
-0.0025 
(0.0111) 
-0.0024 
(0.0111) 
N 145,888 143,669 145,888 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.95 0.95 0.96 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.   ** indicates 
statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.   
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The results for Model 14 are listed in Table 5.9.  The results provide support for the 
hypothesis that states with common cultural attributes experience greater interest convergence as 
a result of interaction within IGOs.  The coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for states 
with no common cultural attributes is 0.002176, whereas for states with at least one common 
cultural attribute, the coefficient for HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 0.002509.   
Model 15 tests the conditioning effect of common culture on HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP 
using the ordinal measure, COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES.  The results of Model 15 also 
provide support for Hypothesis 6.  As illustrated in Figure 5.6, each additional common cultural 
attribute of a dyad is associated with an increase in the effect that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP 
has on AFFINITY and these coefficients are statistically significant at all levels of COMMON 
CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES.  As with the models in which the key IGO variable was JOINT IGO 
SUBSTRUCTURES, neither COMMON CULTURE nor COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES have any 
statistically significant direct effect on interest similarity over any level of HIGH ISSUE IGO 
MEMBERSHIP.  However, as I expected, common culture does enhance the positive effect of 
interaction within certain types of IGOs on interest similarity and therefore Hypotheses 6 is 
supported. 
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Table 5.9. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6) 
 Model 14 Model 15 
Constant 0.181** 
(0.007) 
0.180** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709* 
(0.006) 
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5) 0.002176** 
(0.000583) 
0.002273** 
(0.000561) 
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common Culture(t-5) 0.000333 
(0.000574) 
 
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs for 
Common Culture=1 
0.002509** 
(0.000540) 
 
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Ordinal Common 
Culture(t-5) 
 0.000058 
(0.000347) 
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs for Ordinal 
Common Culture=1 
 0.002331** 
(0.000487) 
Common Culture (t-5) -0.00066 
(0.00337) 
 
Common Culture Traits (t-5)  0.00069 
(0.00264) 
Time -0.00070** 
(0.00009) 
-0.00070** 
(0.00009) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00086** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00086** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political Difference -0.00101** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00105** 
(0.00011) 
Dyadic Trade 0.679** 
(0.341) 
0.699** 
(0.343) 
Relative Economic Development -0.0032** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0031 
(0.0016) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0071** 
(0.0014) 
0.0070** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.060** 
(0.007) 
0.060** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.025** 
(0.001) 
0.025** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.0040 
(0.0113) 
-0.0040 
(0.0113) 
   
N 144,217 143,669 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.95 0.95 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.   ** indicates 
statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.   
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▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence. 
Figure 5.6. Marginal Effect of High Issue IGO Membership conditioned on Common Cultural Attributes 
 
Finally, I test the conditioning effect of each of the cultural attributes on the degree to 
which membership in more IGOs with a high issue coverage affects interest similarity in separate 
models.  The results for Model 16 (listed in Table 5.10) indicate that the marginal effect of HIGH 
ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP on AFFINITY is actually lower for dyads in which both states have the 
same largest linguistic group (COMMON LANGUAGE) (0.00172) than it is for dyads in which the 
two states do not have the same largest linguistic group (0.00254).  Although all of the various 
control models have remained quite stable in terms of sign, statistical significance, and 
substantive effect across the various models presented in this Chapter, it is noteworthy that, in 
this model, DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE is not statistically significant and RELATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT DIFFERENCE is statistically significant.   
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Table 5.10. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6) 
 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Constant 0.184** 
(0.007) 
0.180** 
(0.007) 
0.180** 
(0.007) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable (LDV) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
0.709** 
(0.006) 
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5) 0.00254** 
(0.00049) 
0.00230** 
(0.00051) 
0.00226** 
(0.00057) 
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common 
Language (t-5) 
-0.00082 
(0.00084) 
  
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs 
for Comm. Lang.=1 
0.00172** 
(0.0008) 
  
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common 
Ethnicity (t-5) 
 0.00007 
(0.00117) 
 
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs 
for Comm. Ethnic.=1 
 0.00237** 
(0.00110) 
 
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common 
Religion (t-5) 
  0.00039 
(0.00058) 
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs 
for Comm. Relig.=1 
  0.00265** 
(0.00055) 
Common Language (t-5) -0.088** 
(0.014) 
  
Common Ethnicity (t-5)  -0.0007 
(0.0102) 
 
Common Religion (t-5)   0.000050 
(0.003450) 
Time -0.00070** 
(0.00009) 
-0.00069** 
(0.00009) 
-0.00071** 
(0.00009) 
Diplomatic Missions Low -0.00085** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00086** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00085** 
(0.00004) 
Domestic Political Difference -0.00096 
(0.00011) 
-0.00104** 
(0.00011) 
-0.00096** 
(0.00011) 
Dyadic Trade 0.674** 
(0.341) 
0.699** 
(0.343) 
0.677** 
(0.341) 
Relative Economic Development -0.0030* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0031* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0029* 
(0.0016) 
Relative Economic Size 0.0070** 
(0.0014) 
0.0070** 
(0.0014) 
0.0071** 
(0.0014) 
Relative Military Power 0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
Joint Military Alliance 0.061** 
(0.007) 
0.060** 
(0.007) 
0.061** 
(0.007) 
Cold War 0.026** 
(0.001) 
0.025** 
(0.001) 
0.025** 
(0.001) 
Contiguity -0.0031 
(0.0112) 
-0.0039 
(0.0113) 
-0.0039 
(0.0114) 
N 145,888 143,699 145,888 
R2 within 0.51 0.51 0.51 
R2 between 0.95 0.95 0.95 
R2 overall 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors 
clustered on dyad in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.  ** indicates 
statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence. 
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 This may be due to the fact that states that are former colonies have the same major 
languages as their former colonizers.  Therefore, common language is not a good indicator of 
attributes that would cause different actors to see each other as being in the same peer group.  In 
addition, this measure may be proxying differences in the level of democratization of the two 
states, which normally has a statistically significant, negative effect on interest similarity.  In 
order to further explore this relationship, one would need to look more in-depth at the various 
language groups of each state. 
Model 17 tests the conditioning effect of common ethnicity of the largest ethnic groups of 
the two states (COMMON ETHNICITY) on the effect of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP on interest 
similarity.  For dyads without a common ethnicity, the coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP 
is 0.00230, while for dyads with a common ethnicity the coefficient is 0.00237, which represents 
a small increase in the substantive effect of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP on AFFINITY.  A one 
standard deviation increase in HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP leads to a 0.00285 increase in 
AFFINITY for dyads without a common religion, but a 0.00294 increase in AFFINITY for dyads that 
do have a common religion.   
The results of Model 18 indicate that states with a common largest religious group 
(COMMON RELIGION) also experience greater interest convergence as a result of joint membership 
in more IGOs with a high issue coverage.  The coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for 
states without a common religion is 0.00226, whereas for states with the same largest religious 
group, it is 0.00265.  This means that a one standard deviation increase in HIGH ISSUE IGO 
MEMBERSHIP is associated with a 0.0028 increase in AFFINITY for dyads without a common 
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religion, whereas it is associated with a 0.0033 increase in AFFINITY for dyads that share a 
common religion of the largest religious group.    
With the exception of the models including COMMON LANGUAGE, the various models 
presented above provide support for Hypothesis 6.  In other words, states that have common 
cultural attributes generally experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction 
within IGOs with attributes that were found to be conducive to interest convergence in Chapter 
4. 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 4, I tested a set of hypotheses regarding how more interaction within IGOs should 
lead to greater interest convergence between member states.  The findings of those tests provided 
strong support for the notion that greater interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest 
convergence between member states.  In that chapter, I also provided evidence that member 
states experience greater interest convergence over time the more IGOs with a high number of 
substructures within which they interact, the more total joint IGO substructures within which 
they interact, and the more IGOs with a high issue coverage within which they interact.  In this 
chapter, I then used two key indicators of intra-IGO interaction from Chapter 4 to test three 
hypotheses regarding dyadic attributes that may condition the degree to which certain pairs of 
member states experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within these IGOs.  
These hypotheses set forth the expectation that dyads in which both states are liberal 
democracies, dyads that are closer together on the democracy scale, and dyads that have common 
cultural attributes should experience greater interaction as a result of interaction within IGOs or 
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IGO structures that are conducive to interest convergence.  The first two hypotheses were not 
supported by the results of these tests, but rather showed the opposite relationship to that which 
was expected.  The results of the last series of tests provide support for the hypothesis states with 
common cultural attributes experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction 
within IGOs. 
The first set of statistical models presented in this chapter test the hypothesis (Hypothesis 
4) that dyads in which both pairs of states are liberal democracies will experience greater interest 
convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs than other pairs of states.  I tested this 
hypothesis using both the measure of the total number of joint IGO structures within which two 
states interact (JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES) and the measure of joint memberships in IGOs that 
cover more than two main issue areas (HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP).  I interacted these IGO 
variables with measures of joint democracy and joint autocracy, which I created using data from 
the Polity IV dataset (Democracy-Autocracy).  The results of these tests did not provide support 
for Hypothesis 4, but rather showed that being a joint democracy actually dampens the effect of 
the IGO variables on interest similarity.   
With regard to joint autocracies and mixed dyads, the results were somewhat mixed 
depending on which IGO variable was used in the interaction.  However, for all of the models 
mixed dyads and joint autocracies experienced greater interest convergence as a result of intra-
IGO interaction than did joint democracies.  This finding runs counter to the notion that 
persuasion requires liberal-minded participants and to the expectation that joint democracies 
would experience greater interest convergence.  However, this is most likely due to the fact that 
states that are both coherent, liberal democracies tend to already have quite similar interests and 
therefore there is little change to be picked up after controlling for changes in material factors.  
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However, the question of why joint democracies experience interest convergence as a result of 
interaction within IGOs to a lesser degree than other dyads should be further explored in future 
research. 
Hypothesis 5 states that dyads that are closer together on the democracy scale 
(Democracy-Autocracy from Polity IV) should experience greater interest convergence as a 
result of interaction within IGOs.  The tests of this hypothesis on both IGO variables yield results 
that did not support Hypothesis 5.  As with the joint democracy variable, increasing levels of 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE are associated with higher coefficients on the IGO variables, 
meaning greater interest convergence.  Once again, it may be that states that are farther apart in 
terms of their ideas and interests have more room to converge as a result of interacting within 
IGOs.  The lack of support for this hypothesis could mean that the notion that actors are more 
likely to take on new ideas from other actors that they deem to be in their peer group is wrong.  
However, it may be that the level of democracy of two states is not the dimension on which 
individuals from those states will view each other as being in the same peer group. 
Based on the same logic regarding the likelihood that actors will use others that they 
deem to be in their peer group as a reference when taking in new ideas, Hypothesis 6 states that 
dyads in which the two states have common cultural attributes should experience greater interest 
convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs.  I conducted several tests of this hypothesis 
using the two IGO measures and various operationalizations of common culture.  The results of 
these tests provide consistent support for Hypothesis 6, with the exception of the tests in which 
COMMON LANGUAGE is interacted with the IGO variables.  In general, dyads with shared cultural 
attributes experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within more IGO 
substructures and IGOs with a high issue coverage than do other dyads.  However, COMMON 
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LANGUAGE is associated with a lesser degree of convergence resulting from IGO interaction.  
This result is most likely due to conceptual and/or measurement issues.  First, states that have a 
former colonial relationship may share the same largest linguistic group, despite the fact that 
they have different ethnicities and may not view each other as being in the same peer group.  
Second, to delve further into the question for future research, one should consider other language 
groups besides the largest group and perhaps the number of different languages.   
What the results of these tests do show is that COMMON ETHNICITY and COMMON 
RELIGION do enhance the effect of interaction within IGOs on member state interest similarity.  
This may be evidence that these two cultural attributes are more important dimensions for 
determining how individuals from different states view each other in terms of peer groups. 
The results of the empirical tests presented in this chapter provided mixed support for the 
proposition that states with existing similarities should experience greater interest convergence 
as a result of interaction within IGOs found to be conducive to interest convergence.  The 
findings in this chapter have also provided some interesting questions for future research.  In the 
following chapter, I conclude with a discussion of the overall findings of the dissertation, the 
implications of these findings for research in the field of international relations, the policy 
implications of these findings, and the possibilities for future research on the question of how 
membership in intergovernmental organizations affects the similarity of member state interests 
over time. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation project, I seek to answer the question of which attributes of intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) are conducive to a convergence in member state interests over time.  In this 
chapter I conclude with a summary of the argument and key findings of the dissertation with 
regard to the aforementioned question.  I then discuss the implications of these findings for 
academic research on international relations and for policy-makers involved in the design and 
functioning of international institutions.  Finally, I discuss how the research presented in this 
dissertation can be extended to further explore both the initial question and new questions that 
arise from the empirical findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE BASIC ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS 
The goal of this dissertation is to answer the question of how membership in IGOs leads to 
member state interest convergence.  This question speaks to the larger question in international 
relations regarding whether and how international institutions affect member state behavior.  The 
vast majority of work on this question from institutionalist scholars has ignored interest 
convergence as a possible channel through which membership in IGOs can ultimately affect state 
behavior by controlling for interests when looking for the effects of IGOs on behavior.  The idea 
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that interests are endogenous to interaction is not new and work in that vein has typically been 
associated with constructivist work, especially with work on socialization.   
While the socialization literature has informed the theory that is presented herein, it is 
insufficient to answer the question of how interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest 
convergence.  Research on socialization within IGOs has focused on a small number of cases 
that does not allow one to sufficiently control for a series of material factors that affect state 
interests or to compare across IGOs with different attributes.  In addition, much of this work 
seeks to explain and find evidence of socialization at the individual level of analysis within one 
IGO, which, as I argue in previous chapters, may not necessarily lead to a change in the 
definition of state interests.  I also argue for a move away from the focus on socialization as the 
process of inducting new actors into the norms and rules of a given community.  Instead, I argue 
that all actors are subject to the acceptance of new ideas and that these ideas may not be 
normative in nature, but may also be ideas about cause-and-effect relationships.  
In Chapter 2, I also address the literature on policy diffusion and learning, which may be 
usefully applied to research on interest convergence in international relations.  However, this 
literature is insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to interest convergence 
because, in much of this work, there is a lack of focus on communication networks as a channel 
through which ideas diffuse in the international system.  Those studies that do explore the spread 
of ideas/innovation through networks of communication either suffer from the same empirical 
limitations as the socialization literature or focus only on one specific type of intergovernmental 
organization.  Bearce and Bondanella (2007) attempt to rectify these shortcomings by looking for 
evidence of interest convergence in a global sample, but do not delve into the question of which 
attributes of IGOs are conducive to this process.  
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In Chapter 3, I present a theory of member state interest convergence, focusing on IGOs 
as structures within which state actors interact and take on new ideas that ultimately get 
translated into the definition of state interests.  The theory begins with the proposition that more 
interaction within IGOs provides more opportunities for the spread of ideas and therefore results 
in greater interest convergence.  I choose to use the term interests rather than preferences, 
because, as I argue in Chapter 3, what a state wants or seeks to achieve at any level of abstraction 
is an expression of what it wants at a greater level of abstraction.  My theory is based on the 
notion that ideas spread between individuals from different states and ultimately become 
institutionalized in domestic settings, thus affecting how state interests are defined.  While these 
changes are ultimately expressed in more specific situations, the expressions of preference for a 
certain outcome or the actions of a state are simply visible implications of a deeper change in 
interests.   
Based on the proposition that more interaction leads to more opportunities for actors to 
persuade each other to accept new ideas, I generate three hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs 
that should be conducive to interest convergence.  I hypothesize that states should experience 
greater interest convergence, the more they interact within IGOs with a high number of 
substructures, the more they interact within IGO substructures that bring together ministers of all 
member states rather than simply bureaucrats from different member states, and the more they 
interact within IGOs with a high issue coverage.   
However, all pairs of states may not experience the same degree of interest convergence 
as a result of interaction within IGOs.  I propose that states that already share common attributes 
that make their agents pre-disposed to being persuaded by each other should experience greater 
interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs.  From this proposition, I hypothesize 
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that dyads in which both states are liberal democracies, dyads with a lower distance between the 
two states on the democracy/autocracy scale, and dyads in which the two states share common 
cultural attributes should experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within 
IGOs.   
In Chapter 4, I test the first set of hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs expected to be 
conducive to member state interest convergence.  The various tests of these hypotheses are 
generally supportive of my theory across different measures of intra-IGO interaction.  While the 
substantive effects of intra-IGO interaction are small, they are not inconsequential and are 
similar to the substantive effects of other variables in the models.  While some of the realist and 
institutionalist variables surpass the IGO variables in terms of substantive effects on changes in 
interest similarity, this does not weaken support for my theory, which was never meant to replace 
material factors as an explanation for changes in state interests.  In fact, the null hypothesis is 
that there is no relationship between interaction within more IGO substructures or more IGOs 
with a high issue coverage on interest similarity.  Rather than attempting to debunk existing 
institutionalist theory, the goal of this dissertation is to highlight and explore another causal 
pathway through which IGOs ultimately affect member state behavior, which has heretofore 
been largely ignored.  In other words, the purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that 
interest convergence occurs as a result of interaction within IGOs and the resulting transmission 
of ideas, rather than simply from changes in material factors, and to determine which attributes 
of IGOs are conducive to that process. 
In Chapter 5, I tested the second set of hypotheses regarding which dyadic attributes 
enhance the degree to which interest convergence results from interaction within IGOs.  The 
hypothesis that joint liberal democracies would be more likely to experience interest 
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convergence as a result of more interaction within IGOs was not supported.  In fact, the results of 
various models indicate that joint autocracies and mixed dyads generally experience greater 
interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs found to be conducive to interest 
convergence.  Tests of the hypothesis that states that have a more similar score on the democracy 
scale also showed the opposite relationship to that expected.  The larger the distance between 
two states’ Polity scores, the greater the degree of interest convergence is associated with their 
interaction within more IGO substructures and within more IGOs with a high issue coverage.  
While somewhat puzzling, this finding may indicate that states that are already quite similar have 
little room for convergence.  However, the positive relationship between intra-IGO interaction 
and interest similarity holds across all dyads.  In addition, this interaction seems to mediate the 
negative effect of domestic political differences on interest similarity.  It may also be the case 
that similarity in democracy levels is not an important dimension on which individuals assign 
other actors to their peer group, thus making them more susceptible to persuasion by those 
actors.  The conditioning effects of similar levels of democracy on the degree to which states 
experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs can be better assessed with 
a deeper examination at lower levels of analysis. 
In Chapter 5, I also tested the hypothesis that states with common cultural attributes 
would be more likely to experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs 
with attributes found to be conducive to interest convergence.  This hypothesis is also based on 
the idea from reference group theory that actors give more consideration to new ideas that come 
from other actors they deem to be in their peer group and are therefore more likely to accept 
these new ideas.  The various tests using different measures of common culture were largely 
supportive of this hypothesis.  The more cultural attributes two states share the greater the 
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interest convergence they experience as a result of interaction within IGOs.  However, I found 
that dyads with a common language actually experience a lesser degree of interest convergence 
resulting from intra-IGO interaction than do other dyads.  While this finding is puzzling, it is 
possible that common language of the largest linguistic groups of the two states in a dyad may 
not accurately capture a dimension on which individuals from two states identify with one 
another, especially since certain states have several different linguistic groups and states with a 
common major religion may be quite different on other dimensions.  What this finding may 
indicate as well is that ethnicity and religion are more important dimensions of mutual 
identification between actors.  This is an interesting question to be explored in future research, as 
I will discuss at the end of the chapter.  In the following section, I will discuss the implications of 
these findings for academic research on international relations. 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH 
This dissertation asks which attributes of IGOs are conducive to member state interest 
convergence.  The work presented here builds on my previous research showing that joint IGO 
membership is indeed associated with increases in interest similarity between pairs of states 
(Bearce and Bondanella 2007).  In this project, I have put forth a theory to explain how IGOs 
lead to interest convergence and have provided evidence to support that theory by demonstrating 
that IGOs that foster greater interaction between states have a positive effect on member state 
interest similarity over time.  This is a significant contribution to the question of whether 
interests are endogenous to interaction.  Most institutionalist research looking at the effects of 
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IGOs on state behavior treats interests as exogenous to joint membership in IGOs by controlling 
for interests when looking for IGO effects. 
While constructivist scholars and others studying socialization and learning within IGOs 
have long argued for treating interests as endogenous to interaction, their work has focused 
almost exclusively on a small number of cases, often within the context of Europe.  It is not my 
intention to criticize small-N research, which I believe to be invaluable to the exploration and 
demonstration of causal pathways through more in-depth analysis.  However, to paraphrase 
Fearon and Wendt (2002), the debate between these two research communities has to a large 
extent been a “dialogue of the deaf” due in large part to differences in preferred research 
methodology.  It is my hope that this dissertation will be a step toward integrating some of the 
ideas from these two bodies of work, by demonstrating the degree to which interests are 
endogenous to interaction using the preferred research methodology of rationalist scholars and 
by providing a theory to explain how interaction within IGOs affects interests at the state level.  I 
argue that interest change resulting from interaction does not require identity change, but that 
mutual identification may enhance the degree to which ideas are transmitted between actors 
within the context of IGOs.   
For socialization scholars, the findings of this dissertation can serve as confirmation of 
the basic hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between the amount of interaction 
between actors and an increase in their interest similarity.  However, the question and focus of 
this dissertation is somewhat different from that of socialization scholars.  If one wants to know 
specifically how joining an existing IGO or international community affects a state, then a focus 
on the induction of new actors into the norms and rules of an existing community is sufficient.  
However, the more general question of how IGO membership affects states’ interests cannot be 
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answered without considering that IGOs are structures within which states interact.  IGOs 
provide channels of communication within which actors from different states, both existing and 
new members, continually interact and are thus subject to interest convergence over time.   
I also argue that a focus solely on the acceptance of norms as the process through which 
interest convergence occurs may miss a portion of the convergence that occurs through a 
transmission of ideas regarding cause-and-effect relationships.  While I have not distinguished 
between different types of ideas in the tests of these hypotheses, I provide a coherent theory of 
interest convergence that does not require identity change.  Indeed, much of the policy diffusion 
and learning literature examines the diffusion of ideas absent identity change.  As I will discuss 
below, future qualitative research should examine how the transfer of ideas regarding cause-and-
effect relationships can affect not only specific instances of policy choice or bargaining, but also 
more fundamental interests of a state, with lasting effects on the policies of the state.   
The findings of Chapter 4 show that, counter to my expectation, interaction within more 
secretariat and technical bodies has a stronger substantive effect on the interest similarity of two 
states than do bodies of high-level leaders, which may provide support for the argument of 
socialization scholars that the internalization of new normative ideas is more likely to occur in 
less politicized, more insulated settings (Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005).   
At the same time, however, I demonstrate that interaction within more bodies for 
meetings of high-level leaders is conducive to interest convergence as well.  This expectation is 
based on my theory that the ideas exchanged at the IGO-level should be more likely to become 
institutionalized in the domestic setting if they come through state agents who have the power to 
change the orientation of state interests.  However, it is clear from the findings that this is not the 
only channel through which intra-IGO interaction ultimately affects state interests.  More 
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research into this question at a deeper level of analysis is needed to parse out how interests are 
transmitted from the international to the domestic context.  In fact, one shortcoming of the 
literature looking at both learning and socialization within IGOs is that they fail to analyze how 
new ideas and norms taken on at the international level may ultimately affect state interests in the 
long-run, instead focusing on specific outcomes of bargaining or the socialization of individuals 
within an IGO.  While the level of analysis of this dissertation has not allowed for a deeper look 
at this process, the finding that both interaction within secretariat and technical divisions and 
bodies that bring together high-level state agents is conducive to interest convergence suggests 
that this should be the focus of future research. 
With regard to the vast majority of rationalist institutionalist work, the findings of the 
dissertation suggest that controlling for interests when looking for the effects of IGO 
membership on state behavior actually underestimate the effects of IGOs over time by ignoring 
one channel through which IGOs ultimately affect state behavior – as structures providing 
opportunities for the acceptance of new ideas resulting in member state interest convergence.  
While the substantive effects of interaction within certain types of IGOs or IGO structures are 
small, the effects over time are not inconsequential.  Interest convergence is a gradual process 
and even material factors have similarly low substantive effects on interest similarity when 
looking at the change from one year to the next.  Since interest change is a gradual process, it 
may not always be necessary to treat interests as a moving part.  Depending on one’s research 
question, it may sometimes be necessary and efficient to take interests as given when looking for 
the effects of IGO membership on state behavior over relatively short periods of time.  However, 
if IGO interaction leads to a convergence in states’ interests, as the findings of this dissertation 
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suggest, then it is important to think through how one might conduct further research on IGO 
effects by treating interests as a moving part. 
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the creation of a dataset in which 
IGOs are coded according to different attributes that proxy the amount of interaction that IGOs 
foster between member states.  Research on the effects of IGOs on state behavior such as conflict 
and trade should employ such variables rather than a simple count of IGOs, especially if, as some 
of the findings suggest, membership in IGOs may also lead to interest divergence or provide 
opportunities for low-level conflict.  It may be that some factors related to IGO membership push 
in the direction of greater conflict, but that the processes of persuasion and learning that occur 
between pairs of states experiencing a great deal of interaction within IGOs mediates those 
effects.  This would explain the positive relationship between joint membership in IGOs 
covering a high number of issue areas while one sees a negative relationship between a simple 
count of IGOs involving economic issues (which would be the majority of all IGOs).   
Finally, the theory and findings of this project speak to the literature on similarity within 
the international relations literature.  In addition to examining how IGOs affect member state 
interest similarity, I examine how similarity between pairs of states may actually make interest 
convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs more likely.  The findings with regard to how 
similar levels of democratization affect the degree to which intra-IGO interaction affects interest 
similarity do not provide support for the hypothesis that states with a similar scores on the 
democracy scale will experience greater convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs, but 
rather show the opposite relationship.  It may be that coherent liberal democracies are already so 
close together that they have less room for interest convergence as a result of interaction within 
IGOs.  The results indicate that they do experience interest convergence through membership in 
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a large number of IGO substructures, but they do not do so to a greater extent than do other 
dyads.   
The findings with regard to common culture suggest that common culture is such a 
dimension.  In fact, the finding that common language does not enhance the degree of interest 
convergence resulting from interaction within IGOs while common ethnicity and religion do so 
indicates that the causal mechanism between common culture and affinity is related to identity.  
A common language may facilitate communication between actors, which is more of an 
information mechanism, whereas common religion and ethnicity are more tied in to an actor’s 
identity.  If this is the case, then the finding that common language does not facilitate greater 
interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs while common religion and ethnicity 
do actually implies that the theory is correct in expecting these dyadic attributes to facilitate 
persuasion due to the actors’ mutual identification as part of the same peer group.   
The findings in Chapter 5 suggest that scholars of international relations should not 
assume that similarity breeds affinity22, but rather, they should test which types of similarity 
cause actors to have an affinity for and therefore to behave differently toward each other.  This 
should be applied to work not only on interest convergence and the effects of international 
organizations on behavior, but also to the conflict literature, in which similarity is sometimes 
expected to be synonymous with affinity and therefore to reduce conflict.  Recent work on 
cultural similarity and conflict has headed in the direction of breaking down cultural similarity 
into more meaningful categories (e.g. Leng and Regan 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006; 
Mishali-Ram 2006).  The findings herein confirm that cultural similarity tout court may not have 
                                                 
22 The term “affinity” used here should not be confused with the variable “Affinity” which is simply the name that 
the dependent variable in this study was given by its creator – in other words, interest similarity should not be 
equated with concept of affinity.  Whether interest similarity between actors leads them to have an affinity for one 
another is an empirical question. 
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a substantively strong impact on interest similarity and that the relationship between cultural 
similarity and affinity needs to be further explored. 
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this dissertation have important implications for global governance.  If the goal 
of global governance is not only to manage problems that cross borders, but also to promote 
cooperation and peaceful relations between states, then insight into the questions of whether and 
how certain structures of IGOs affect state behavior and cooperation should inform the design of 
international institutions.  The results of various tests presented in this dissertation provide 
evidence that IGOs are more likely to facilitate interest convergence between member states the 
more they foster interaction between individuals from the member states. 
This not only suggests that policy-makers involved in designing and reforming the 
structure of intergovernmental organizations should create structures that involve more frequent 
interaction, but it also strengthens the arguments of policymakers who advocate joining or 
maintaining memberships in IGOs.  In fact, even the United States Army appears to be interested 
in how socialization might be useful as “a process where sustained interactions change how 
countries view the United States and their own security interests” (Marquis et al. 2006).  In 
addition to thinking about how a state might want to foster greater interaction with other states 
through IGOs to promote more similar interests and therefore peace, it is also important to note 
that these results show that the existing academic research on IGOs have underestimated the 
effects of IGOs on state behavior and possibly on preventing conflict.      
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The finding that interaction within large numbers of secretariat and technical divisions of 
IGOs is conducive to member state interest convergence is actually good news for advocates of 
greater international cooperation.  Greater cooperation on technical matters, which have the 
possibility to be less political, should be easier to achieve.  The findings of this dissertation also 
suggest that IGOs with a high issue coverage are conducive to member state interest 
convergence.  This indicates that, rather than dealing with issues one by one or in separate IGOs, 
states should attempt to deal with several issues within the framework of one IGO, since this 
facilitates greater interaction between state agents to manage those issues.  This should not only 
reduce transaction costs, but should also lead to greater interest convergence over time. 
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a number of ways in which this dissertation can and should be extended into further 
research on the question of how interaction within IGOs leads to interest convergence between 
member states.  The first important extension of this project would be to elongate the time series 
of the dataset by coding the IGOs in the dataset for all post-World War II years.  This elongation 
of the time series could be important in testing whether the relationship between membership in 
IGOs that foster a high amount of interaction and interest convergence holds over a longer period 
of time.  It may also be useful for assessing the effects of time or of certain periods of time prior 
to the 1970s. 
There are a series of research projects that can be done to further this research agenda, 
three of which are particularly important.  The first project would be to study the effects of IGO 
interaction on state interests within specific issue areas.  This requires that one break Gartzke’s 
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Affinity data (Gartzke and Jo 2002), which is used to measure state interest similarity, into the 
similarity of interests in specific issue areas.  The Affinity data are a series of S-scores (see 
Signorino and Ritter 1999) which essentially measure the distance between states’ votes in the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on all issues voted on in each year.  This measure is 
typically used to measure state interest similarity in the IR literature.  In order to look at interest 
similarity within specific issue areas, one could code all UNGA votes by issue area and then 
recalculate S-scores of state interest similarity by issue area.  Correspondingly, one should 
further code my sample of IGOs into those covering these same issue areas and test the effects of 
interaction within IGOs covering specific issues with interest convergence in those same areas.   
In addition to testing for interest convergence within specific issue areas, it is important 
to test the implications of my theory with regard to the ultimate effect of IGO-induced interest 
convergence on state behavior, including behavior in areas such as human rights and trade.  
While the first project proposed above aims at providing more specific evidence of interest 
convergence resulting from a convergence of interests in the same issue areas, it is not clear that 
interacting within IGOs in one issue area cannot affect two states’ interest similarity and 
behavior in other areas.  In fact, Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) demonstrate that economic 
behavior is affected even by connectedness in IGOs that were formed for social or cultural 
purposes.  Therefore, future research should to test the effects of greater interaction within 
networks of IGOs on state behavior in various issue areas through the causal mechanism of 
interest convergence.   
Finally, while the findings of this dissertation provide empirically robust evidence of 
interest convergence resulting from greater interaction within certain IGOs, a deeper analysis of 
this process may shed some light on how both normative and cause-and-effect ideas that are 
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exchanged at the IGO level become institutionalized in the domestic context.  Case studies could 
also help to illuminate how this process may differ or may be more or less effective through 
interaction of bureaucrats v. high-level state leaders. 
In this dissertation, I provided a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to member 
state interest convergence, which is generalizable across IGOs and across regions.  From the 
theory, I generated a set of hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs that should be conducive to 
interest convergence and attributes of dyads that condition that process.  Although my theory 
draws on some core ideas from the existing literature on socialization, policy diffusion, and 
learning, I depart from the existing literature by providing an explanation of interest convergence 
that focuses on IGOs as structures within which member states interact with each other and are 
constantly subject to the acceptance of new ideas regarding both norms and cause-and-effect 
relationships.  The empirical tests also depart from existing work arguing that interests are 
endogenous to interaction by testing the hypotheses in a global sample with which it is possible 
to control for the various material factors that also affect interests.  The findings have important 
implications for both academic research in international relations and policy-related issues.  
While there is much work to be done to further our knowledge of how IGOs affect member state 
interests, this represents an exciting point of departure. 
 
APPENDIX A 
CODING IGO SUBSTRUCTURES 
In order to test my theory regarding how interaction within intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) leads to member state interest convergence, I needed to code IGOs based on the number 
of various types of structures that they have.  The units in the raw dataset are IGO-years, which 
includes all IGOs for the period 1970-1995.  I used the IGO-years listed in the Correlates of War 
(COW) IGO dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2003) as a base for this dataset.  Therefore, IGOs are 
defined as organizations whose members include three or more sovereign states, that have a 
permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters, and that hold regular plenary sessions at 
least once every ten years (Pevehouse et al. 2003). 
For each of the IGO-years in the dataset, I collected information regarding several 
variables that were used in this chapter: the total number of substructures, the number of bodies 
for meetings of ministers of member states, the number of secretariat and technical divisions, the 
number of main issue categories, and the number of economic issue categories.  As noted above, 
the measures of the total number of substructures include all main bodies of the IGO in a 
particular year, including general/plenary assemblies, executive bodies, bodies for meetings of 
various types of representatives, tribunals, committees, subcommittees, working and study 
groups, and secretariat and technical divisions.  Since my goal is to measure the amount of 
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interaction between individuals from different states I counted all main divisions of secretariats 
or other technical divisions mentioned separately, rather than counting them all under one body 
as the secretariat, which would make them equivalent to bodies within small IGOs that truly do 
have only one office/division that serves as its secretariat.   
There are some cases in which the entry for an IGO-year mentions only “committees” or 
“working groups” without giving a specific count of such structures.  If the preceding and/or 
following years’ entries do give a more specific count, that number is used as an estimate of the 
number of committees, etc. in that year.  If no more complete information is available, I counted 
one for each type of structure that is mentioned.  In other words, if the entry mentions 
“committees” this means that there is at least one committee so I counted one more body.  This is 
relatively unproblematic since the IGOs that do not give complete information tend to be those 
which do not have a lot of structures and the variable related to this measure counts joint dyadic 
membership in IGOs that have more than five substructures, rather than being a measure of all 
structures within which the two states interact.  The dyadic level variables used for empirical 
analysis in this chapter are based on COW’s IGO membership data, but counts joint dyadic 
membership only for IGO-years in which the IGO meets the criteria of having more than five 
substructures.  
As mentioned in the text of the chapter, the data for the number of bodies for meetings of 
ministers of all member states include a count for each formation of each body.   This means that 
a Council of Ministers with many different formations to bring together ministers in different 
issue areas on a regular basis would be counted several times to capture the number of 
formations.  The purpose of this counting method is to give as even a weight as possible to each 
“body” in terms of the amount of interaction that it facilitates between state agents.  
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In order to measure issue coverage of the IGOs I started by creating six categories of 
issue areas: security issues, political issues (which includes various types of foreign policy 
cooperation and issues such as immigration and border control), economic issues, social and 
cultural issues (including sub-issues such as education, health, and social development), 
environmental and animal welfare issues, disaster prevention and relief (which includes sub-
issues such as relief for natural disasters, disease control, and pest control).  Although there are a 
myriad of ways in which one could categorize issues, I believe that these categories cover 
distinct types of issues and that counting these issues separately for each of these categories 
allows for a reliable indication of IGOs that foster greater interaction between member states.  In 
order to delve into a more specific sub-set of issues, I coded economic issues into several 
categories: trade, money and banking (which includes finance, banking, and investment), 
commodities groups (which, although it may be considered more of a type of IGO, is distinct 
from trade in the types of issues that are covered for specific commodities), economic 
development, science and technology, and other regulatory issues.  For a detailed listing of how 
specific issues fit into both the main issue categories and economic issue categories, see 
Appendix B.   
The data was drawn largely from the Union of International Association’s (UIA) 
Yearbook of International Organizations.  However, during the 1970s, the Yearbook was not 
published for every year, but usually for two year periods (e.g. 1970-1, 1972-3, etc.).  When 
structures changed from one edition to the next, I made an effort to find out in which year it 
changed using later editions of the Yearbook as well as the IGOs’ websites, when possible.  If the 
exact year of the change was still uncertain, I applied the same information to both years of the 
two year period in which the Yearbook was published.  For example, if the number of structures 
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was different in the 1970-1 edition than in the 1972-3 edition, the information from the 1972-3 
edition would be applied to both 1972 and to 1973.  However, the main bodies of the IGOs are 
relatively sticky so this should not pose too much of a problem for the variables counting bodies 
for meetings of all representatives or bodies for meetings of ministers.  The number of 
committees, technical divisions, and other bodies included in the variable counting the total 
number of substructures of the IGOs are a bit less sticky, but imputing the data to consecutive 
years for certain cases should not be too problematic.  Furthermore, testing all different types of 
structures ensures that results do not depend on the use of a particular measure.  Although each 
test is based on a particular hypothesis, they are all derived from the proposition that interaction 
within more substructures leads to greater member state interest convergence. 
Finally, if data was missing altogether for an IGO-year and the number of bodies could 
not be discerned from later editions of the Yearbook or from the IGO’s websites, then the IGO-
year was coded as missing and was therefore not counted in the joint IGO membership variables.  
Since my variables are meant to code the amount of interaction that states have within IGOs, it is 
actually appropriate not to count IGO-years in which IGOs were not active enough for UIA to 
obtain information as to their activities or changes in their structures. 
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APPENDIX B 
CODING IGO ISSUE COVERAGE 
While I cannot guarantee that the specific issues listed below are completely exhaustive of every 
very specific issue covered by each IGO, it is a fairly complete representation of issues.  The 
issues are categorized by the main issue categories under which they fell for purposes of coding 
IGOs for issue coverage.  Some specific issue could pose a problem in that they could be placed 
in two different main categories or in two different economic issue categories.  If indeed, they 
indicate that the IGO covers both categories of issues and therefore should foster greater 
interaction to deal with both sets of issues, then the IGO was coding for both categories.  For 
example, “sustainable development” entails both economic development and environmental 
issues. 
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B.1 SECURITY ISSUES 
B.1.1 Security 
• Alliance 
• Armament 
• Arms Control 
• Confidence- and security-building measures 
• Defense planning and budgets 
• Defense policy and strategy 
• Disarmament 
• Military cooperation 
• Nuclear installations 
• Nuclear weapons (prohibition; non-proliferation) 
• Peacekeeping assistance 
• Preventive diplomacy 
• Radiation and nuclear safety 
• Security impacts of economic developments 
 
 
B.2 POLITICAL ISSUES 
B.2.1 Foreign Policy and other political issues 
• Conflict/crisis management/resolution 
• Dispute settlement 
• Foreign policy cooperation 
• Opposition of colonial domination/anti-colonialism 
• Political integration/cooperation 
• Rights of states to sovereignty and territorial integrity 
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B.2.2 Interior/internal Affairs, Border control, Crime prevention, and Police cooperation 
• Arms smuggling 
• Art theft 
• Border control 
• Border development 
• Control of firearms, ammunitions, and related materials 
• Cyber crime/IT crime 
• Drug trafficking/drug control 
• Economic crime 
• Human security 
• Illicit trade 
• Immigration/migration 
• Money laundering 
• Organized crime 
• Penal system 
• Terrorism 
• Sea piracy 
 
B.2.3 Legal Issues 
• Law 
• Legal cooperation/legal harmonization 
• Legal and constitutional affairs 
• Legal consultation 
• Judicial/Juridical cooperation and Justice 
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B.2.4 Democracy Promotion/democratization 
• Civil service 
• Elections/electoral observation 
• Freedom/civil rights 
• Good governance  
• Institution-building 
• Legislative and constitutional reform 
• Political reform/corruption 
• Representative democracy 
• Rule of law 
• Social justice 
 
B.3 ECONOMIC ISSUES 
B.3.1 Trade 
• Commerce 
• Trade/Trade liberalization 
• Trade of specific commodities 
 
B.3.2 Money and Banking 
• Banking 
• Finance 
• Investment 
• Loans and debt 
• Macro-economic policy 
• Monetary Relations 
• Regional stock exchange 
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B.3.3 Commodities 
• Cooperation on specific commodities or in specific sectors 
o Policy/regulation 
o marketing/promotion 
o price stability 
 
B.3.4 Economic Development 
• Capital assistance/development aid 
• Cultural Development 
• Development of SMEs  
• Development of entrepreneurship 
• Development of market infrastructure 
• Economic development 
• Human Resource Development 
• Industrialization 
• Infrastructural development 
• IP infrastructural development 
• Natural resource development 
• Science and technology development/IT development  
• Spatial planning/spatial policy 
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B.3.5 Science and Technology Research/Cooperation 
• Air conditioning/heating 
• Astronomy 
• Automation 
• Bioethics (human cloning) 
• Cartography 
• Chemistry/science 
• Ethics of scientific knowledge and technology 
• Genetic engineering and biotechnology 
• Geography 
• Geophysics 
• Hydrography 
• Marine technology 
• Measurement 
• Meteorology 
• Molecular biology 
• Oceanography 
• Particle physics/nuclear physics/atomic energy 
• Refrigeration 
• Seabed exploration 
• Space 
• Technical cooperation 
 
 143 
B.3.6 Other Regulatory/Other Economic 
• Aeronautical 
• Agriculture 
• Agro-business 
• Acquaculture 
• Enterprise affairs  
• Exhibition regulation 
• Fishing 
• Industry/industrial relations/industrial policy 
• Information and Communications 
o Information and communication technology 
o Media policy 
o Multimedia 
o Postal Services 
o Public relations 
o Space communication 
o Telecommunications 
• Insurance and reinsurance 
• Intellectual Property 
• Manufacturing 
• Privatization/market transition 
• Services and public works 
• Taxation/fiscal policy 
 
B.4 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES 
B.4.1 Cultural Cooperation 
• Culture/cultural relations/affinities 
• Cultural activities 
• Cultural heritage protection 
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B.4.2 Education 
• Education in public administration 
• Examination standardization 
• Higher education 
• Literacy 
• Technical education 
• Vocational training 
 
B.4.3 Health/Public Health 
• Consumer affairs/protection/safety/health 
• Disease control  
• Drug addiction/drug abuse prevention 
• Health education 
• Medicine 
• Nomenclature 
• Nutrition 
• Tobacco use (health issues) 
 
B.4.4 Social issues 
• Family 
• Housing and reconstruction 
• Labor issues/labor market  
• Minorities/indigenous populations 
• Population policies 
• Recreation 
• Social issues of immigrants and emigrants 
• Social security and social welfare 
• War graves/memorials 
• Women’s issues/women’s equality 
• Youth issues 
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B.4.5 Human Rights 
• Civil rights 
• Humanitarian issues 
• Privacy/data protection 
 
B.5 ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL WELFARE ISSUES 
B.5.1 Animals 
• Animal disease control 
• Dolphins 
• Endangered species 
• Safety in trade in animals and animal products 
• Veterinary service and infrastructure improvement 
• Whaling regulation and conservation 
• Wildlife 
 
B.5.2 Environment 
• Biodiversity 
• Ecological safety 
• Marine resource conservation/marine environment 
• Natural resource management/exploitation 
• Ozone 
• Pollution 
• Reforestation 
• Soils conservation 
• Sustainable development 
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B.6 DISASTER PREVENTION AND RELIEF 
B.6.1 Disaster Prevention/Control/Relief/Emergency relief 
• Natural disaster relief 
• Humanitarian aid 
• Demining 
• Civil defense/protection/safety and civil emergency planning 
• Radiation protection 
• Drought and desertification 
• Pest control 
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